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Abstract 
Dwelling prices are determined in the long run by the total costs of a development, 
where costs include regulatory costs, including costs of delay and uncertainty. We 
outline a conceptual framework for the development process and then develop a real 
options model of housing development that indicates more formally how regulatory 
policies and regulatory practices affect development decisions. We apply these insights 
to the design of a survey of property developers active in the Auckland market, with an 
emphasis on the ‘affordable’ part of the market. In surveying developers, we aim to elicit 
their views regarding the impacts that planning rules and regulations have on total 
development costs. We do not attempt to value the corresponding benefits of the 
planning rules and regulations, so this study is not a cost: benefit analysis of council 
planning approaches; rather it documents the costs of the rules and regulations – as 
perceived by developers – to provide a basis for benefits to be compared. Almost 90% of 
surveyed developers have been affected by delays or uncertainties related to regulation. 
Regulations that have had major effects on the actual building costs of apartments 
include: building height limits, balcony requirements, conforming to Council’s desired mix 
of apartment typologies and minimum floor to ceiling heights. Major cost effects on 
developing residential sections and standalone dwellings include: infrastructure 
contributions not related to the specific development, section size requirements, 
extended consent processes and urban design considerations stemming from Council’s 
urban designers. Reserve and development contributions and Watercare levies affect 
the costs of both types of development. Excluding the cost of Watercare and reserve 
and development contributions, the typical cost range of the total impact of regulations is 
estimated to vary between $32,500 and $60,000 per dwelling in a subdivision. In terms 
of affordable apartments, assuming the total internal floor area remains the same and no 
deck is built, the impact on total cost typically is estimated to range between $65,000 
and $110,000 per apartment.    
JEL codes 
K29, R31, R38 
Keywords 
Residential property development; planning rules; delay; uncertainty; Auckland   
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Executive Summary 
 Dwelling prices are ultimately determined by the total costs of development. Costs 
include construction and land costs, opportunity costs, costs of council rules and 
regulations, costs of delay and uncertainty, and financial costs with allowance for risk. 
 In the case of certainty, a project will proceed if and only if expected market prices for a 
development exceed the expected total costs. Thus council-related costs can transform a 
viable project into one where no development occurs. 
 Greater uncertainty reduces the likelihood that a prospective development will proceed. 
Greater delays and less certain consent outcomes increase uncertainty. 
 Greater front-end consent costs raise the developer’s holding costs so reducing the 
likelihood of development. In addition, early lock-in of consent parameters reduces a 
developer’s flexibility to react to changing market conditions so reducing the likelihood of 
embarking on a development. These effects may be partially offset if early lock-in 
reduces uncertainty over consent outcomes. 
 To provide evidence on the impacts of council-related costs, we present results of 
interviews with Auckland developers, focusing on ‘affordable’ housing.  The interviews 
provide information on 21 developments from 16 developers with the objectives of: 
- Understanding the reasons behind the design of individual developments, including 
the impacts of council planning rules, regulations and actions; 
- Estimating the reported per unit cost impact of council rules, regulations and actions; 
and 
- Understanding how delay and uncertainty affect developers’ decisions to develop or 
not to develop a project.1 
 All the surveyed developers stated that they had abandoned one or more projects as a 
result of expected project length and/or uncertainties. 
 Table 2 in the main document lists the effects of council-related actions on estimated 
development costs per dwelling for developments that proceeded.  
 For affordable apartments, building height limits and balcony requirements can each 
have cost impacts of over $30,000 per apartment; conforming to council’s desired mix of 
typologies and increased minimum floor to ceiling heights can each add over $10,000 per 
apartment. Minimum floor area requirements reduce the supply of affordable units.  
 For residential sections and standalone dwellings, elements that can raise costs by at 
least $15,000 include: infrastructure contributions that are not directly related to a specific 
                                                
1 The information presented with regard to each of these aspects reflects the respondents’ own views about 
costs. Unless otherwise specified in the main report, costs relate to existing (legacy) regulations, rather than 
to regulations proposed under the Auckland Unitary Plan.  It was beyond the scope of the project to estimate 
corresponding benefits, so our study cannot be interpreted as a cost: benefit analysis of regulation. Ideally, 
relevant authorities will assess the benefits of each regulatory aspect and compare those estimated benefits 
to the estimated costs.. 
     4 
development, section size requirements, extended consent processes and other urban 
design considerations (stemming, in particular, from council’s urban designers).  
 A range of other elements cause lesser, but still material, cost increases per dwelling. 
 Developers consider that council has not balanced or arbitrated contradictory demands of 
different parts of council and council controlled organisations (CCOs) when considering 
consents. Developers have been left to mediate disputes over how the development 
should be designed, adding significant uncertainty and risk. 
 Developers felt that they were increasingly being asked to fund key community 
infrastructure beyond infrastructure directly related to their own project. 
 Council-imposed urban design requirements are subjective, so increasing the length of 
time required to gain consent, increasing the costs of the planning process, reducing the 
saleability of units within developments and increasing costs.   
 Council imposed rules and regulations result in a significant loss in potential development 
capacity2.  The median loss in capacity was 22% (for developments that proceeded).  For 
apartment buildings, the loss of capacity was primarily due to height restrictions or issues 
relating to view shafts. In other developments, the loss in capacity related to issues 
associated with urban design requirements, retention of heritage building and protected 
trees, and the need to provide on-site infrastructure over and above what was required to 
service the development. 
 As a result of residents’ objections, council has hitherto tended to notify non-complying 
consents even when the effects are relatively minor.  This increases uncertainty and 
timeframes for consent applications. 
 The business strategy adopted by the developer impacts on the level of uncertainty and 
amount of time required to complete the consenting process.  The “complying developer” 
attempts to minimise the consenting timeframe.  However, there is significant cost in 
terms of incorporating all Council officers’ preferences in the development’s design and 
the process may result in a sub-optimal product in terms of market demand. As a result, 
developers abandon a significant number of projects.  Conversely, the “non-complying 
developer” is prepared to work with longer timeframes with less certain outcomes, but 
this requires the developer to be well capitalised in order to fund long-term legal 
processes with uncertain outcomes. 
___ 
  
                                                
2  The loss in development capacity is defined as the difference between the optimal market related 
development capacity and the capacity after council related restrictions are imposed. 
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Impacts of Planning Rules, Regulations, Uncertainty and Delay 
on Residential Property Development 
 
1. Introduction 
The property development community often cites the cost of local and central 3 
government planning regulations and rules as a cause of high (and rising) residential 
property prices. Costs in this context may include direct costs, opportunity costs arising 
from forced changes to proposed developments, costs of providing specific 
infrastructure, costs of delay, and costs related to uncertainty about consenting 
decisions. However there is a paucity of data to assess whether these claims have merit. 
This report is designed to provide some evidence concerning these claims, drawing on 
industry based experience. First, we present a framework for considering the issues, 
highlighting the importance both of regulatory policies (i.e. the regulations themselves) 
and of regulatory practices (i.e. the implementation of the regulations). We then use a 
counterfactual research methodology in which we question developers directly 
concerning a range of planning-related matters to find out whether certain policies: (a) 
raise costs of particular forms of development, or (b) prevent particular developments 
from proceeding at all. 
We stress at the outset that our analysis only covers costs of regulations, not their 
benefits. Thus our study should not be interpreted as a cost:benefit analysis of any of the 
regulatory policies or practices discussed. Regulations are adopted because the relevant 
authorities consider that they have benefits that outweigh their costs. The New Zealand 
Productivity Commission4 highlights, for instance, that land use regulations are imposed 
because of the existence of externalities (actions of land users that affect the amenity 
use of others), less than optimal provision of amenities without regulation, and/or 
coordination failures (for instance, in the timely provision of infrastructure).5 In order to 
assess whether the benefits of regulation outweigh the estimated costs, one must 
necessarily understand the costs imposed, and it is this step on which we concentrate. 
Ideally the regulatory authorities can then explicitly assess the benefits of each of the 
                                                
3 National legislation such as the Resource Management Act affects council approaches, for instance, to 
notification of developments. 
4 New Zealand Productivity Commission. 2014. Using Land for Housing. NZPC: Wellington. 
5 For a useful overview of the multiple benefits that arise from urban planning, see: Adams D. & Watkins C. 
2014. The Value of Planning. RTIP Research report No. 5. 
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regulatory aspects that we analyse to determine whether the benefits do indeed 
outweigh the costs.  
In examining costs, we concentrate, in particular, on investigating what impacts, if any, 
planning rules and regulations, council-related delays and uncertainty have on the 
development cost of residential dwellings within the ‘affordable housing’ category. 6  
Unless stated otherwise, we examine the effects of existing (legacy) planning rules and 
regulations, some of which will alter with the proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP). 
The study’s scope includes the subdivision of land, and construction of stand-alone 
dwellings and apartments, with an Auckland focus. Specifically, we report information on 
what a developer develops given actual council planning rules, regulations and actions, 
and compare the cost implications of this outcome against those that would be 
associated with the developer’s preferred development if it was unconstrained by those 
council rules, regulations and actions (thus incorporating opportunity costs).  Since 
planning rules, regulations and council actions have the potential to impact on 
development costs at each step of the development cycle, we have undertaken in-depth 
interviews with a number of medium to large developers across a number of 
development styles (albeit with a focus on affordable dwellings). Our developer sample 
includes land-subdividers, standalone dwelling developers, suburban and central city 
apartment developers, and retirement village operators. It is not a random sample of 
developers, instead reflecting the experience of the developers interviewed. Our 
judgement, however, is that the costs indicated by these developers are representative 
of costs faced by other developers.7 
Given these interviews, we have endeavoured to ascertain the extra per unit cost for an 
affordable dwelling that is caused by the relevant restriction. We note that the effect of 
these costs on the price of a dwelling will depend on market factors. The price effects of 
changing the cost structure are expected to be more apparent in the long run than in the 
short run. We discuss this issue more in the next section. Section 3 provides a formal 
framework used to assess the effects of regulatory policies and regulatory practices, 
including uncertainty and delay, on development. Following this discussion, section 4 
sets out our survey approach and presents the results of our property developer survey. 
                                                
6 As a rule of thumb, we concentrate on effects of council-related actions on dwelling prices in the sub-
$500,000 dwelling category. 
7  This judgement reflects similar cost estimates across the surveyed developers, and also reflects 
information obtained from separate discussions with consultants to the industry.  
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Section 5 then discusses the implications of the survey results in the context of the 
frameworks outlined in sections 2 and 3.  
 
2. Costs, Prices and Residential Development 
To provide context for the detailed information presented from our survey, consider a 
developer who owns, or who has an option to acquire, a piece of land and is planning 
the development of a new dwelling on that land.8 In the absence of council regulations 
and consenting processes, the developer will assess market demand (and hence market 
prices) for alternative dwelling types and compare these prospective prices to the costs 
of development (including finance, materials and labour costs). The financing costs will 
include an allowance for risk; i.e. required expected profit will be higher for a more risky 
development. As discussed more fully in section 3, the degree of risk is likely to be 
positively related to the length of a development since costs and prices vary over time, 
so the developer has less certainty over the residual profit (that accrues to the 
developer) as the development period lengthens. The degree of risk (and hence the 
required return on capital) is also increasing in the degree of uncertainty, including in 
relation to consenting decisions, and particularly notification. As shown in section 4.11, 
developers are averse to projects that require public notification because of the delays 
and increased uncertainty associated with such projects relative to non-notified projects.9 
Taking the expected price, costs and risk into account, the developer will build the type 
of dwelling that maximises the developer’s (risk-adjusted) expected profit. In doing so, 
the developer takes market prices and costs essentially as given for each type of 
development (since the developer is assumed to be small in relation to the total market). 
If no development type is expected to yield a sufficient profit (i.e. to make a sufficiently 
high risk-adjusted return on the developer’s equity, after first paying debt-holders) then 
the developer will choose not to develop and instead will incur zero further costs and will 
await a better development opportunity in future. 
                                                
8 To keep the example concise, we just refer to development of a single dwelling, but the example can easily 
be extended to a multi-dwelling development.  
9 The PAUP is intended to allow more developments to proceed on a non-notified basis to avoid costs and 
uncertainties associated with public notification of developments with minor non-complying elements. 
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Aggregating all developers together10, we expect new developments to occur in a locality 
so long as the sale price of new dwellings exceeds the total cost (including required 
return on capital) of those new developments. Thus the dwelling stock will increase 
when sale prices exceed the total costs of development. Conversely, the housing stock 
will stagnate if market prices are below costs. As a result of these two forces, in (long 
run) equilibrium, the price of a new dwelling should equal the total cost of development 
of that dwelling (including the required return on capital after accounting for risk and 
uncertainty). Thus, at the individual level, the developer is a price-taker (and cost-taker) 
while, at the aggregate level, the long run price will be set by the total cost of 
development. In the short term, excess demand may push the price above total costs, so 
bringing forth new supply to meet the excess demand. 
Now consider how a cost imposed by a council, that is not already part of the 
developer’s optimal plans, impacts on this situation (e.g. introduction of a mandated 
minimum stud height). 11  The new cost will add directly to the total cost of the 
development. This may have one of three short-term outcomes. First, if there was 
initially surplus profit for the developer (over and above the required return on capital) 
that is in excess of the added cost, the original development (with the added cost 
feature) can still proceed and the developer will end up with a lower, but still acceptable, 
profit on the development. 12  Second, the added cost may cause the developer to 
develop an alternative type of (profitable) dwelling that now yields a better profit than the 
modified original development. Third, the developer may choose not to develop the site 
currently either if there is now no profitable type of development available or if delaying a 
development is expected to lead to a more profitable development opportunity in future 
(after accounting for holding costs) because of an expectation of future price rises (or 
cost reductions).  
Note that in the first two options, the short run market price of the development is 
assumed to remain unchanged by the council’s requirement since the developer cannot 
push up the market price just because their individual costs have increased. In all three 
                                                
10 As in Grimes A. & Hyland S. 2014. “Housing Markets and the Global Financial Crisis: The Complex 
Dynamics of a Credit Shock”, Contemporary Economic Policy. Forthcoming. 
11 We do not examine the benefit side of the equation, so the analysis here is purely about cost and supply 
impacts of regulation. As a result, we do not make any judgements as to whether council-imposed costs 
(and/or delays or uncertainties) have a net social benefit or not. 
12 This assumes that the added cost feature does not also enhance the market price. If it does enhance 
price then the development can proceed provided that the added price plus the original surplus profit 
exceeds the added cost. 
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cases, the long run price will be pushed up by the added cost since, in the long run, 
prices are determined by the total cost of development. This process occurs even with 
the third option, since the lack of new development causes a shortfall of dwellings which 
pushes up price through excess demand to the level where new supply will be 
forthcoming.13  
Now consider a situation in which the developer experiences council-imposed delays 
and/or uncertainties about the likely type of development that will be approved. These 
circumstances can be considered a cost in the same way as an explicit added cost of 
construction. In the case of a known length of delay, the developer faces: (a) added 
financial holding costs, and (b) greater risk surrounding other costs and prices. Each of 
these raises the required expected return in order to undertake the development, and 
hence raises the total cost. Again, while this might not affect the short run price charged 
for the development, it will raise the long run price of such dwellings. 
In the case of uncertainty, the issues are magnified since not only is there a delay 
incurred, but also there is no certainty that a development will even be feasible once the 
full council (and related) processes are undertaken. As in the previous cases 
considered, this may lead to a change in the type of development or a decision not to 
proceed with any development.14 The latter situation, in particular, will have a long run 
impact on prices if other developers also face similar uncertainties. Grimes and Hyland’s 
(2014; op. cit.) analysis indicates that a 1% decrease in the housing stock relative to 
population leads to a 2.2% increase in the real house price for an area. Thus the house 
price effect of decisions not to develop will depend on how large is the number of 
foregone dwellings in relation to the existing dwelling stock and the population of the 
area.  
The difficulty that these alternative circumstances pose for the analysis in this paper is 
that certain council-imposed costs (such as the impact of regulations on uncertainty) are 
not always reflected in the immediate price of a development. Indeed, it is unlikely that 
the immediate price of a specific development will be affected materially by an added 
cost placed on a developer. Rather the main effect is a long run one as prices eventually 
                                                
13 Again, see Grimes and Hyland (2014, op. cit.) for a more detailed analysis of this point. 
14 In section 4, we find that developers filter out a large number of potential developments at an early stage 
of the development process in cases where the expected market price for the units is insufficient to meet the 
expected costs, including council-imposed direct costs and costs of delay and uncertainty. 
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reflect total costs. In our analysis we have therefore attempted to quantify the effect of 
certain council actions on costs, with the understanding that these costs will eventually 
be reflected in prices. Costs of uncertainty, in this respect, are the most difficult to value 
since frequently they may result in a development being abandoned at an early stage 
(e.g. at the original scoping stage) and so there is little specific cost information available 
in this case.  
Another complicating factor for the analysis is that where council-imposed costs lead to 
a change in the developer’s chosen development type, the added cost of the (now 
avoided) feature is not apparent in the final cost structure. Again, its effect is on the long 
run price of developments that would require that specific feature.  
Given these complications, we have adopted two alternative strategies to shed light on 
the effects of council actions on development. First, in section 3, we provide a formal 
model of development under uncertainty. The model provides a rigorous framework for 
interpreting the impacts that uncertainty, delay and other council-related actions have on 
development choices. While helpful as a conceptual framework, this model cannot 
provide the detailed information needed to quantify the actual effects of council 
regulations and actions. The second approach, detailed in section 4, presents the results 
of our survey in which we ask a broad range of questions of developers to help quantify 
the effects of a range of council-related activities on development costs. The questions 
also provide indications of when council-related actions impact on decisions of whether 
to develop at all. In our concluding section, we place these factors into the context of the 
discussion in sections 2 and 3, relating to short-term and long-term price effects of 
council actions. 
 
3. A Real Options Model of Housing Development 
In order to understand how regulatory policies and regulatory practices, including delays 
and uncertainty, may affect the development process, we consider a stylised three stage 
model of development. Each stage may be of different (and initially indeterminate) 
lengths. The three stages are denoted s=0,1,2. 
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At stage s=0, a developer has access to an area of land (CBD, brownfields or 
greenfields) that is physically capable of being developed for urban use. The developer 
must decide at stage 0 whether to apply for consent(s), and the type of consents, to 
develop the land. Consents may range from the full gamut of consents shown in Figure 1 
(section 4), including master plan changes, etc, to minimal consents for a complying 
activity. Given the existing regulations, the developer’s choice of proposed development, 
and hence of consent types, will affect: (a) consenting and development timeframes; (b) 
the probability of gaining a consent; (c) allowable development alternatives; and (d) 
expected costs and revenues. Hence the probability of eventually undertaking the 
development is conditional on this strategic choice. A developer will apply for the type of 
consent(s) that maximises the expected value of the project as viewed at stage 0. 
The initial stage cost of the chosen consent application is denoted A; a more complex 
consent has a higher A than a less complex consent. A includes all costs of designers, 
consultants, lawyers, etc involved at this stage of the process. 
Development can only proceed if the development process delivers an outcome in which 
development can legally proceed. We denote a positive consent outcome as ‘|C’ (i.e. 
given a consent), although the conditions of the consent may differ from (be more 
restrictive than) those initially applied for. The ex ante probability of being granted a 
consent, given that cost A has already been incurred, is denoted p0 where this 
probability is viewed as at stage 0 prior to cost A being incurred. If no consent is 
forthcoming (or none has been applied for) then the project is abandoned. The 
developer may then return to a new stage 0 and decide whether or not to embark on a 
new consent application. 
A consent, if obtained, occurs at stage 1, at which time the developer has the choice of 
deciding to undertake the development or to abandon it (effectively returning to stage 0). 
Just because the consent is granted, there is no obligation for the developer to develop. 
The developer will only develop at stage 1 if the development’s expected value, as 
viewed from stage 1, excluding the sunk cost A, is positive.   
Expected project value (as viewed from stage 1), given that a consent has been 
obtained and that development proceeds, is denoted V|C
1  which equals discounted 
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expected revenues from a completed development (obtained in stage 2) less expected 
building and other costs (incurred in stage 1). Thus V|C
1  is given by: 
V|C
1 =
E(R|C)
1+r1
− B|C     (1) 
where E(R|C) is the expected revenue from the development in stage 2 conditional on a 
consent, r1 is the discount rate over stage 1 (which is a function of the expected length of 
the development) and B|C is the actual cost of the development in stage 1 conditional on 
a consent. 
Development will only proceed at stage 1 if V|C
1  > 0. At stage 0, a developer places 
probability p1 on V|C
1  > 0 given that a consent has been granted. Thus, at stage 0, the 
probability of a development proceeding is given by p0.p1 (i.e. the probability of a 
consent being granted multiplied by the probability of the development proceeding if it 
has been consented). The probability of a consented project actually being developed 
may be less than 1 since market conditions may change between stage 0 (when the 
consent was first applied for) and stage 1 ( when the consent is granted).  
Importantly, the probability of abandonment at stage 1 increases (p1 decreases) as the 
length of the development process increases. To illustrate why this occurs, consider an 
example in which the expected market price next period of a development is $500,000 
but that the outcome is expected to be either $500,000 minus $20,000 or $500,000 plus 
$20,000, each with probability 50% (i.e. equal chances of either $480,000 or $520,000). 
Two periods ahead, the price could again increase or decrease by $20,000 from the 
period 1 price, three periods ahead it could again increase or decrease by $20,000 from 
the period 2 price, and so on. By period 4, the probability distribution of the outcomes 
(with probabilities in brackets) is: $440,000 (0.125), $480,000 (0.375), $520,000 (0.375), 
$560,000 (0.125). By period 5, the probability distribution is: $420,000 (0.0625), 
$460,000 (0.25), $500,000 (0.375), $540,000 (0.25), $580,000 (0.0625). If a price of 
$475,000 is required to go ahead with a development, then there is a 12.5% chance that 
a decision taken after 4 periods will be to abandon the project, but if the decision is 
delayed until the fifth period there is a 31.25% chance that the project will be 
abandoned. Notably, this increase in the probability of abandonment (reduction in p1) 
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occurs despite the expected value of the market price remaining constant at $500,000 
throughout. 
Combining stages 0 and 1, a developer will apply for a consent at stage 0 if and only if 
(iff) the value of the project at stage 0 (V0) is positive, i.e. iff: 
V0 = −A +
p0p1V|C
1
1+r0
>  0    (2) 
where r0 is the discount rate over stage 0 which is again a function of the expected 
length of stage 0. The expected length of stage 0, in turn, will depend in part on the 
complexity of the consent(s) applied for. The type of consent(s) that the developer will 
seek will be that which maximises V0. 
The probability of choosing to develop at stage 1, p1, will be dependent on the volatility 
of outcomes at stage 1. For instance, as viewed from stage 0, the expected profit at 
stage 1 may be positive. If there is no volatility in that outcome then p1 = 1. However, for 
the same expected profit, the greater the degree of volatility (e.g. in revenue, costs or 
discount rates) the greater will be the proportion of occurrences where V|C
1  < 0; thus 
greater volatility of outcomes at stage 1 reduces p1. Volatility in outcomes may be driven 
by: (a) market forces affecting market prices and building costs; (b) the length of time 
between stages 0 and 2 since a greater variance of outcomes is likely over a longer time 
period; and (c) planning uncertainties which may affect the nature of the development 
relative to what was originally envisaged, and so affect R|C and B|C.  
There are therefore several avenues through which the regulatory and consenting 
process may affect the decision of a developer on whether to embark on a consent 
application. The process may affect: 
i. The likelihood of achieving the consent(s) applied for, which in turn depends on: 
(i.a) the restrictiveness of regulatory policies (relative to the developer’s optimal 
development), and (i.b) the degree of uncertainty in relation to the interpretation 
of the regulations (e.g. uncertainty relating to specific aspects of the regulatory 
practices of decision-makers); 
ii. The length of time taken to achieve a consent (which affects both the stage 0 
discount rate and the probability of proceeding at stage 1 given a consent); 
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iii. The length of development time contingent on a granted consent, for instance by 
adding extra consultation or inspection phases once the consent has been 
granted (which affects both the stage 1 discount rate and the probability of 
proceeding at stage 1 given a consent); 
iv. The cost of preparing and obtaining a consent (A); 
v. The costs of the development itself caused by consenting conditions (B|C); 
vi. The revenues of the development caused by consenting decisions (R|C); 
vii. The volatility of profits through added uncertainties (in addition to the volatility 
effects of delays). 
Two important points arise from this list of effects of consenting processes on 
development decisions. First, the combination of these factors means that the effective 
cost of the consenting process is much greater than the costs incurred solely in 
preparing and obtaining a consent application (A). Furthermore, these combined costs 
are in addition to the expected effects of planning rules that are already taken into 
account in designing and choosing the preferred project.  
Second, a developer has choices at stage 0 that affect how great these effects may be 
for a particular development option. Consider, for instance, a case where a developer 
has a plot of land worth $50,000 that is capable of being developed for a single dwelling 
unit. The developer has two alternative projects ,  and . As shown in Table 1 (column 
1), Project  has consenting costs of $25,000 so that up-front land plus consenting costs 
are $75,000. The expected revenue from the project, given a consent, is $500,000, while 
building costs are $330,000. Each of the two stages is expected to take 12 months with 
a discount rate of 0.01 (1%) per month, resulting in a compound interest rate for each 
stage of 0.127 (12.7%). If the probabilities of gaining a consent and of proceeding with 
the project were each 1 (i.e. conditions of complete certainty) the value of the project at 
stage 0, from equations (1) and (2), would be $25,925 so that the project would be 
eligible for development.15   
A simpler project, project , is also available to the developer with consenting fees of 
only $10,000 (column 2 of Table 1). The difference in consenting costs may be because 
project  stretches the boundaries of what may be permitted so involving considerable 
design and legal costs, while project  conforms with existing planning rules. In this 
                                                
15 A spreadsheet incorporating the model and the values presented here is available from Arthur Grimes. 
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case, if all other costs and probabilities were identical, the developer can afford to have 
a lower expected revenue of $480,954 and still have the same value project. (Note that 
the reduction in revenue is $19,046 which equals the $15,000 reduction in consenting 
costs discounted over the two stages.) 
We can alter the project parameters to see how various factors affect development of 
each project. Specifically, we solve for the value of each factor individually that makes 
each project’s value at stage 0 (V0) equal to zero. Column 3 of Table 1 shows the value 
of each factor, when taken in isolation holding all other factors constant, that yields V0 =
0 for project ; column 4 similarly shows the values for project .  
 
Table 1: Stylised Model Values 
 Initial Values  Extreme values1 
 Project  Project   Project  Project  
Up-front costs (A) 75000 60000  100925 85925 
Expected revenues (R|C) 500000 480954  467082 448036 
Building costs (B|C) 330000 330000  359213 359213 
Prob of a consent (p0) 1 1  0.743 0.698 
Prob of stage 1 proceeding (p1) 1 1  0.743 0.698 
Months (stage 0)2  12 12  41.8 48.1 
Months (stage 1)2 12 12  18.8 19.1 
Project value (V0) 25925 25925  0 0 
1 Each value in these columns, ceteris paribus, takes the value of the respective project (V0) to zero. 
2 The monthly discount rate is set at 0.01 (1%); thus a 12 month stage corresponds to a stage discount rate 
of 12.7%. 
 
 
With project , a 41.8 month consent processing time for the stage 0 consent would 
render the project valueless (V0 = 0) whereas project  could withstand a 48.1 month 
processing time. If processing time was expected to be less than 12 months, project  
would be preferred, while if processing time was between 12 and 48.1 months, project  
would be preferred; if processing time was expected to be greater than 48.1 months, 
neither project would proceed. The lower up-front consenting costs of project  relative 
to project  enables project ’s greater resilience to consent processing time. If the 
actual consent led to a lengthening of the stage 1 construction period to 18.8 months, 
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project  would be rendered valueless, whereas project  could withstand a slightly 
longer construction period of 19.1 months; again the financing costs of the higher up-
front consenting costs for project  is the reason for this difference.  
Project  requires at least a 0.74 probability of gaining a consent to have value at stage 
0, whereas project ’s required consent probability is 0.70; the same respective 
probabilities apply for proceeding at stage 1. Again, the lower up-front consenting costs 
of project  explain its greater resilience to variation in these parameters. With certainty, 
both projects can suffer an identical decline in expected revenues ($32,918) or increase 
in building costs ($29,213) from their baseline levels before losing all value. 
Each of the figures in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 is presented in the context of a change 
to a single factor influencing the development choice. In general, however, a change to 
one factor may cause changes in related factors. For instance, a lengthier consent 
process at stage 0 is likely to reduce the probability of proceeding with a development at 
stage 1 since there is likely to be a greater chance of negative outcomes for expected 
revenues and building costs as the development process lengthens. Thus an increase in 
the number of months taken for consenting is likely also to reduce the value for p1. As an 
example, recall that for project , a consent process of 41.8 months, ceteris paribus, 
would render the project valueless; however if p1 fell to 0.9 as a result of the delay, then 
a consenting time of 31.2 months would render the project valueless. Project  could still 
proceed with a consenting time of 31.2 months if p1 was at least 0.85.16 
In the model above, all consenting costs have been allocated to stage 0. However it is 
possible that these consents (and costs) could be shared across stages 0 and 1. We can 
denote this as a consenting cost A-X at stage 0 and as a building plus consenting cost 
B|C +X at stage 1, where X is only borne at stage 1 if the required initial consents have 
been granted at stage 0; for simplicity we assume that the future consenting cost, if the 
project goes ahead, is known at stage 0. The higher consenting cost to be met at stage 
1 reduces V|C
1 , ceteris paribus, and hence contributes to a reduction in p1. Conversely, 
the delay in some aspects of a consent to stage 1 may enable a more flexible response 
if market conditions change between stages 0 and 1, so contributing to a rise in p1. Thus 
it is unclear whether p1 will rise or fall with a move to two-stage consenting. Denote p1 
                                                
16 Other combinations of parameters can be considered within the available spreadsheet. 
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under the initial (one-stage consent) structure as p1
^ and that under the distributed (two-
stage consent) process as p1
∗ , and initially assume that no other variables change as a 
result of the distributed consent process. Recall that an initial consent will be lodged if 
and only if it is profitable to do so at stage 0. Using the one-stage consenting structure, 
with equation (1) inserted into equation (2), an initial consent will be lodged iff:  
V0^ = −A +
p0p1
^[
E(R|C)
1+r1
−B|C]
1+r0
>  0    (3) 
where V0^ (V0∗) denotes the value of the project at stage 0 under the one-stage (two-
stage) consenting process. Using the two-stage consenting structure, an initial consent 
will be lodged iff:   
V0∗ = −(A − X) +
p0p1
∗ [
E(R|C)
1+r1
−(B|C+X)]
1+r0
>  0   (4) 
Thus the difference in value at stage 0 between the two-stage and one-stage consenting 
structures is: 
V0∗ − V0^ = (1 −
p0p1
∗
1+r0
)X +
(p1
∗ −p1
^)p0[
E(R|C)
1+r1
−B|C]
1+r0
   (5) 
The first term on the right hand side of (5), which is positive, represents the advantage of 
a two-stage process for the developer stemming from a delay in up-front consenting 
costs. The advantage comprises both a saving in consent costs in the case that the 
project does not proceed (so that X does not need to be spent) and a financial saving as 
a result of delay in the timing of costs even where the consent costs are incurred. The 
second term on the right hand side of (5) will be positive or negative depending on 
whether p1
∗  is greater than or less than p1
^. The greater the volatility in market conditions, 
the greater is the prospect that p1
∗ > p1
^  so that two-stage consenting is preferred. In 
more settled market conditions, p1
^ may be less than p1
∗ , raising the likelihood that one-
stage consenting is preferred. If delaying the lodging of some consents raises p1 or does 
not change it markedly (so that the second term is positive or a small negative), then the 
two-stage consenting process is beneficial for development. However, if the two-stage 
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consenting process significantly reduces the probability of proceeding at stage 1, the 
one-stage consenting process may be more conducive to development. 
The example above considered that the switch to a two-stage consenting process only 
leads to a change in p1. However the same insights carry over to cases where the two-
stage process may also change other variables. A shortening (lengthening) of overall 
consenting times, leading to a reduction (increase) in combined financial costs through r0 
and r1, will be favourable for development while a decrease in E(R|C) or an increase in 
B|C will be detrimental to development. The key point is that a one-stage consenting 
process resolves uncertainty earlier than does a two-stage process, which is beneficial 
for developers, but at the cost of greater up-front financial cost, which is detrimental for 
developers. If consents that are inconsequential for the success of the development can 
be delayed, a two-stage structure is preferred over a one-stage structure; but where the 
outcome of consents is uncertain, the analysis does not clearly favour one structure over 
the other. 
One message to take away from all these examples is that numerous planning and 
regulatory elements, including uncertainty and delay, can combine to change the 
decision of a developer about whether or not to develop a project.  
A second, more nuanced, message is that planning and regulatory issues may rule out a 
developer’s ex ante preferred project but the same rules and processes do not 
necessarily rule out development of the same available land; an alternative project 
(either by the same or a different developer) may still proceed that has different 
consenting costs, probability of consenting success and/or different timeframes, building 
costs or expected revenues relative to the initially preferred project. 
The ability to substitute one project for another makes it conceptually difficult to measure 
the costs of planning and regulatory matters. For instance, an increase in consenting 
times may shift the preferred development from project  to project  in the example 
above. The cost of the extra consenting time cannot be measured by the abandonment 
of project ; rather it is the loss of producer plus consumer surplus (plus any extra 
uncompensated resources used by the consenting authorities) entailed in moving from 
project  to project . In general, unless no project replaces the ex ante preferred project, 
we cannot derive a clear estimate of this loss (nor do we have an estimate of any 
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offsetting benefits that might arise from the extended consenting process, such as 
accommodation of neighbours’ concerns). Furthermore, often we do not even observe 
the foregone projects (and hence their parameters) and instead only see the parameters 
for the projects that replaced them. In interpreting our empirical work, these observations 
need to be kept in mind; most of our direct cost estimates relate to projects that did 
eventually occur, albeit sometimes in modified form as a result of the planning and 
regulatory process. 
 
4. Property Developer Survey 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section, we complement the conceptual framework with data obtained from our 
survey of residential property developers.  The discussion covers our methodology; the 
impact of rules and regulations on residential development costs and profitability; other 
issues identified in the survey; developers’ business strategies; retirement village 
developers’ experiences relative to greenfield and apartment developers; uncertainty 
considerations; and issues relating to development uncertainty. Unless otherwise stated, 
the analysis in this section of the report relates to Auckland’s existing (legacy) planning 
rules and regulations rather than the provisions include in the PAUP. Some provisions 
incorporated into the PAUP, and some changes in planning practices within Auckland 
Council, will have the effect of reducing costs relative to those modelled in this report 
while others (such as a minimum stud height requirement for certain dwellings) may 
increase costs. 
It is important to note that the information presented in this section of the report is the 
respondents’ views (rather than those of the authors) regarding the market and the 
impacts that planning rules and regulations have on development costs and uncertainty.  
It is also important to stress that some of these rules and regulations have benefits 
which may offset some or all of the costs identified in this study.  However, it is beyond 
the scope of this project to identify these benefits. Rather, we supply (developers’) 
baseline cost estimates against which others’ analyses of benefit can be compared. In 
addition, it is beyond the scope of the project to investigate directly the actions of Council 
and their agencies (Auckland Transport and Watercare), although we do report on 
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developers’ views of their actions.  The focus of this study is on Auckland, with an 
emphasis on the affordable end of the housing market. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this part of the project involved two key steps.  The first 
used a series of face to face semi-structured interviews with property developers.  The 
objective of these interviews was to: 
 Understand how planning rules and regulations influenced their 
development’s design and outcomes relative to the optimal design based 
on their assessment of market demand and feasibility; 
 Collate financial information from developers relating to development 
costs with a particular focus on the costs associated with the consenting 
process and the application of Council’s rules and regulations; and 
 Address specific questions on planning policies and planning practices to 
assess their effects on a development’s risk and uncertainty. 
The information collated from the developer interviews was subsequently used to model 
the impact of the planning rules and regulations that developers identified as having a 
significant impact on a development’s outcomes using a counterfactual approach.  The 
approach compares the base development case with scenarios which reflect the impact 
that different Council planning rules and regulations have on development costs. A copy 
of a sample costing spreadsheet used for a hypothetical greenfields development and 
one used for a hypothetical apartment development is attached in Appendix 1.  
The survey approach was pilot tested on two Wellington based developers and the 
Auckland based interviews were completed during June and July 2014.  Surveyed 
developers were all active in the market and were in the process of completing at least 
one development. We did not include any prospective developer who had chosen not to 
undertake any developments as a result of Council or other factors. This exclusion may 
bias the results towards findings of lower costs of Council rules and actions since all 
developers contained within the sample have found a way to develop within the current 
framework. Given the small number of active developers in the market, the developers 
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who were surveyed were not chosen randomly but were instead selected to traverse a 
range of development types including: 
 Greenfield subdivisions; 
 Infill/brownfield developments; 
 Residential builders; 
 Suburban and CBD apartment developers; and 
 Retirement village developers. 
In total the interviews collated information on 21 developments from 16 developers. 
Signed confidentiality agreements were provided to each developer participating in the 
survey. The developers included in the survey were medium to large firms.  The 
developments included in the analysis included 5 greenfield, 9 infill/brownfield and 7 
apartment developments.  The developments ranged in size from smaller infill sites with 
fewer than 10 units up to greenfield projects which will have more than 1,000 dwellings 
on completion.  Approximately 60% of the developments commenced (the first stage) 
prior to the formation of Auckland Council.  The development sites were distributed 
across the whole of Auckland Region.  Four of the developments were located in the 
northern part of Auckland, five were located in the west, three in the south, six are in the 
isthmus, and three in the central city. 
The interviews were divided into two phases.  The first phase encompassed a 
counterfactual approach to understand the reasons behind the design of an individual 
development and how Council planning rules and regulations may have impacted on the 
design.    Developers were asked to: 
 Describe the development and how it related to the market conditions at 
the time it was developed; 
 Describe the development design process; 
 Describe why the development was designed in the way it was; 
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 Discuss the factors influencing the development’s design (various 
prompts were available to cover a range of areas); 
 Provide specific information on the development’s financial outcomes; 
and 
 Discuss how the property may have been developed if the Council rules 
and regulations were relaxed and the impact that this would have had on 
the development’s cost and profitability. This counterfactual concept 
investigated how the property would have been developed in the 
absence of particular planning rules and regulations, including drawing 
out the financial implications of these issues. 
The second phase of each interview addressed a number of specific questions focused 
on stages in the planning process and the implications of these stages on the 
development’s uncertainty and risk. 
The financial data collected from developers was used to model the impact of each 
attribute on development costs of developments that proceeded. Developers provided a 
range of information on their developments and the cost of planning rules and 
regulations.  This ranged from limited data on the cost of a rule or regulation for their 
development to a detailed breakdown of the development’s costs.  This information was 
used to develop financial models for greenfield and apartment developments as shown 
in the spreadsheets in Appendix 1. These models were used to simulate the impact of 
different rules and regulations on the cost per dwelling unit.   
The impact of planning rules and regulations varied across the different developments 
for a number of reasons. These included the location of the development, initial 
underlying zoning of the site, the existing infrastructure available, the operative planning 
rules for the location, the individual staff members who were assessing the resource or 
building consent (in particular planners and urban designers), the nature of property 
market demand relative to planning rules and regulations, and the natural and physical 
attributes of the site. In addition, the information supplied by developers relates to a 
range of projects. Some of these reflect current costs whilst others have been underway 
for a number of years. As a result, the costs and levies reflect the way in which rules and 
regulations were actually applied over a number of years and thus reflect past and 
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present policy.  Consequently, the impact of the different planning rules and regulations 
is expressed as a range per dwelling unit.17 
One key finding that needs to be stressed at the outset is that developers undertake a 
comprehensive filtering process on prospective developments at an early stage of a 
project, often before they have control over a site (but when they may have an option or 
opportunity to acquire the site). At this stage, they make a decision on whether or not to 
embark further on the development after assessing the required up-front costs (and 
hence the costs of being left with a potentially stranded asset), expected market price of 
the finished units, total costs (including Council-imposed costs) and risk (including risks 
associated with planning delays and uncertainties). According to developers, it is at this 
stage that many of the Council-related costs and actions have their greatest impact in 
the sense that the development decision is often not to proceed in the light of these 
costs and uncertainties. Alternatively, a different type of development (that is not optimal 
in the eyes of the developer) may instead be considered. In each of these 
circumstances, market prices rise as a result of the shortfall in supply rather than directly 
reflecting specific costs. For our purposes, these cases do not result in observed added 
costs of development because the development does not proceed. Thus our observed 
costs are likely to represent a lower boundary on the actual cost and price impacts of the 
actions and regulations that we examine. 
 
4.3 Planning approval process and potential time delays 
The size and nature of a residential development can impact on the number of 
planning/resource management steps that are required between purchasing land and 
ultimately developing dwellings on the site.  During the development process, ownership 
of parts of the development may change.  Figure 1 provides an overview of this process, 
summarising the planning and approval process for a larger greenfield development. 
 
  
                                                
17 The cost ranges indicated in Table 2 refer to cases where costs (including opportunity costs) were actually 
incurred by a project. They are expressed as the lowest to the highest cost impact across our developer 
sample where we have excluded some outlying high cost estimates that may be idiosyncratic to a particular 
development. 
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Figure 1:  Planning Approval Process 
 
 
Note that smaller developments may combine a number of steps into one and may develop individual lots (rather than 
super lots) and seek subdivision and earthwork consents within the same resource consent. 
 
A section 224(c) certificate is a final approval from Council that all conditions of the subdivision consent have been 
complied with.  Once Council is satisfied that all conditions of subdivision consent have been complied with then the 
224(c) certificates are signed. The developer then lodges this certificate with Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) to 
allow separate titles for the newly created lots to be issued. 
 
 
  
Resource Consent 
Subdivision of super lots into developable lots 
Resource Consent 
Subdivision to super lots 
Resource Consent 
Earthworks associated with individual titles 
Building Consent 
Individual dwellings developed and sold 
Resource Consent 
Earthworks associated with super lots 
Plan Change and/or rezoning to 
residential use 
Resource Consent 
Development Master Plan  
224c issued by Council / Titles issued by LINZ/ 
Super lots may be sold 
224c issued by Council / Titles issued by LINZ/ 
Individual developable lots may be sold 
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The planning approval process may require multiple resource consents before a building 
consent can be issued.  Developer feedback suggests Auckland Council now requires 
more detailed information earlier in the consenting process than was previously the 
case.  As discussed in section 3, this has two potential effects.  First, it increases the 
costs in the initial stages of the consenting process and potentially lowers the cost in 
later stages. While providing greater certainty to developers after the initial stages of a 
development, it has a drawback in that it reduces developers’ flexibility over the final 
design of the development.  Developers report that they prefer flexibility over final design 
as this allows them the opportunity to adapt to market demand over the project’s life. 
From a planner’s perspective, reducing flexibility has the advantage of increasing 
certainty over the outcomes from the development. 
The length of time required for this process varies considerably.  The key factors 
impacting on the length of the planning process include: 
 The size and scale of the development; 
 The initial planning designation of the land and the scale of any change 
of use via a plan change, if a plan change is required; 
 Whether the development proposal conforms to the existing planning 
rules; 
 Whether the proposed development is a radical change relative to the 
existing land use, style and density of other developments in the 
surrounding area; 
 The quality of the information provided to Council by the developer and 
their consultants; 
 Whether Council officers support or disagree with the development 
proposal; 
 The level of earthworks required to develop building platforms; and  
 The availability of infrastructure.  
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Figure 2 presents a summary of the timeframes achieved in the various developments 
included in the developers’ survey. This figure relates only to developments that have 
proceeded and does not include developments that did not proceed. 
 
Figure 2:  Development Timeframes from Initiation of the Planning Consultation 
with Council to Granting of the Consent to Allow Civil Work to Commence 
 
 
 
The median length of time taken to obtain the required consents was 18 months.  These 
timeframes incorporate a number of consenting stages and also include any time 
required to respond to Council’s queries for additional information.  A number of 
developments appear to have almost stalled in the consenting process and took over 
100 months to gain consent.  These developments typically had issues such as being 
outside the metropolitan urban limit (MUL) and were going through a plan change 
process.  Alternatively, they related to a development involving the intensification of an 
urban site which attracted considerable opposition from the local community. 
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Within the typical 18 month consenting timeframe, developers considered there were 
four to six months of Council related delays.  These delays reflected time associated 
with requests for additional information, time required to facilitate compromises between 
different parts of Council with regard to requests for design modifications18 and the time 
required to incorporate any agreed changes into the project’s design. 
 
4.4 Impact of regulations on residential development costs 
The survey identified a number of development attributes which are affected by 
residential planning rules and regulations.  Each of these attributes is discussed along 
with a summary of developers’ comments and the estimated per dwelling cost 
implications for the development. The cost implications are calculated on the basis of the 
spreadsheet templates included in Appendix 1. The development attributes include:  
 Intensification including height limits, section sizes, green space 
requirements, and unit orientation; 
 Floor to ceiling heights (hypothetical impact under initial discussions for 
the Auckland Unitary Plan); 
 Mix of units within a development; 
 Floor area requirements, room sizes and balcony requirements; 
 Green star ratings (hypothetical impact under PAUP); 
 Impact of delays in the consenting process; 
 Infrastructure standards and costs including reserve, development and 
Watercare contributions; 
 Urban design considerations; and 
 Heritage controls and tree protection. 
                                                
18 For example, requests from planners, urban designers, and Auckland Transport may conflict (see section 
4.10 for further discussion of this issue). 
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Overall developers’ sentiment was that Auckland Council did not cope well with the 
concept of development. Council was seen as wanting to preserve the existing 
environment (both within urban and rural areas) whilst wanting to increase the density of 
development. These concepts conflict with each other since development, by its very 
nature, alters the landscape, so explicit trade-offs are required.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the impact of each of these attributes (each taken in 
isolation) on development costs. The following sub-sections provide more detail on each 
cost attribute. While each development was impacted in some way by Council’s rules 
and regulations, each development was unique in the way in which these factors 
influenced costs.  Thus some of the costs impact on some developments but not others 
and, as discussed previously, some costs resulted in a decision not to proceed with a 
development at all. In the affordable apartment category, height limits, minimum floor to 
ceiling heights, balcony requirements and minimum floor area requirements 19  were 
particularly important in stifling developments. 20  Section design considerations (e.g. 
section sizes, site coverage, heritage protection, etc.) had an important effect on 
decisions whether or not to develop residential sections and stand-alone dwellings. 
Excluding the cost of Watercare and reserve and development contributions, the typical 
range of the total impact varied between $32,500 and $60,000 per dwelling in a 
subdivision.  In terms of affordable apartments, assuming the total internal floor area 
remains the same and no deck is built, the impact on total cost typically ranges between 
$65,000 to $110,000.  Note, the existing building regulations in Auckland City require all 
CBD apartments to have decks and in this case the counterfactual development 
excludes decks.21  The majority of the cost relates to height limits on the building and the 
area of the balcony which is no longer included. These estimates assume  a 2.4 metre 
stud height. An increase in supply of more affordable apartments could be achieved by 
reducing the existing minimum allowable floor area of the units. 
 
                                                
19 Current minimum floor area requirements for CBD apartments are:  Studio (30 m2 internal plus 5 m2 
balcony, one bedroom (40 m2 internal plus 5 m2 balcony), two bedroom (62 m2 internal plus 8 m2 balcony), 
and three or more bedrooms (82 m2 internal plus 8 m2 balcony) 
20 Indeed, we do not even enter a cost estimate for minimum floor area requirements since these often 
resulted in a decision not to proceed with a development that included affordable units. Where these 
requirements led to larger than preferred units (i.e. where the development proceeded) the cost impact is 
difficult to ascertain since the quality (size) of the apartment has also increased. 
21 The balcony regulations are an example where the principal cost arises from an opportunity cost of the 
use of space rather than from direct construction costs. 
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Table 2:  Cost Impacts of Planning Rules and Regulations* 
Rule and Regulations Increase in Cost per Dwelling1 
 Apartments Subdivisions 
Building height limits $18,000 to $32,000 See note 2 
Section size / density controls n/a $11,000 to $19,000 
Site coverage/setbacks/green space n/a $5,000 to $10,000 
Unit orientation See text See text 
Floor to ceiling heights3 $21,000 to $36,000 n/a 
Dwelling floor areas  See text See text 
Balcony area $40,000 to $70,000 n/a 
Green star ratings See text $4,000 to $7,000 
Extended consent process $3,000 to $6,000 $4,000 to $16,000 
Provision of additional infrastructure See text $10,000 to $21,250 
Infrastructure standards See text See text 
Mix of dwelling units $6,000 to $15,000 n/a 
Reserve & development contributions $14,000 to $19,000 $20,600 to $34,800 
Watercare contributions4 $12,500 $12,500 
Other urban design considerations $1,500 to $8,000 $9,000 to $20,000 
Heritage and tree protection See note 5 $6,000 to $10,000 
* All costs include opportunity costs in addition to direct construction costs. 
1 In cases where this factor is the limiting constraint. 
2 There was no definitive information available from the developers surveyed on the impact of building 
height restrictions within the selection of subdivisions included. 
3 The modelled effect here is of a minimum stud height of 2.7m (as discussed early in the PAUP 
consultation phase) whereas the PAUP incorporates a less restrictive 2.55m minimum stud height. We 
estimate that the cost for an affordable apartment of a 2.55 metre minimum stud height will be 
approximately half that shown, i.e. approximately $10,500 to $18,000. 
4 Watercare contributions have recently increased to $12,500 per connection. 
5 Typically sites with heritage or tree protection considerations were filtered out as potential development 
sites early in initial feasibility studies and as a consequence there was not definitive information available 
on these costs. 
 
 
 
Intensification - height limits 
Rules and regulations restricting the height of developments impact on the development 
capacity of sites and hence on per unit costs.  The proposed unitary plan has introduced 
a range of height limits across the urban area, some of which reduce the development 
capacity of suburban and central city sites (as a result of new viewshaft requirements). 
The impact of height limits varies significantly across different sites.  On the sample of 
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developments included in our analysis the impact under the existing planning rules and 
regulations ranged from an increased cost per unit of $18,000 to $32,000. 
The impact of the height limits on the development capacity of a site resulted in: 
 A reduction in the number of units in a development of between 0% and 
29% in suburban locations.  Note, that in the example of the development 
in which the capacity was reduced by 0%, it required the developer to 
significantly change the design.  Achieving the same floor area required a 
much larger building footprint, so reducing profitability; 
 A reduction in the desired capacity by 34% to 49% over the economically 
optimal height in the CBD; and 
 A restriction in the potential number of apartments that can be developed 
on a site, particularly when height limits are combined with view shafts.  
This results in a large number of potential developments being 
abandoned at a very early stage of the feasibility assessment, particularly 
within the central city area. 
Appendix 2 includes a representative sample of developers’ comments on this and on 
other issues covered in this section.  
 
Floor to ceiling heights 
Floor to ceiling (stud) height requirements can impact on a development in a number of 
ways.  First, they increase the cost of construction.  Second, they increase the height of 
a building for a given number of levels. There are no floor to ceiling height controls under 
the existing planning rules and regulations.  However, under the PAUP a minimum stud 
of 2.55 metres will be introduced in the terraced house and apartment block and central 
city zones.  The analysis used in this report assumed a 2.7 metre minimum stud height 
reflecting the upper end of the submissions on minimum stud heights when the 
developer survey was being undertaken.  
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In locations where height limits are imposed based on height in metres this can reduce 
the number of levels within a building and consequently reduce the number of 
apartments.   
Developers’ estimates of the impact of increasing the stud height (to 2.7 metres) is that it 
increases the cost by $360 to $600 per square metre in CBD apartments or, in some 
cases, prevents a development from proceeding. These costs are applicable to the lower 
end, or more affordable, apartments as this category is where stud heights act as a 
binding constraint. 
 
Mix of units within an apartment building 
Apartment developers expressed concern that Council staff were trying to force them to 
include unit typologies that had limited saleability.  For example, developers suggest that 
urban designers like to see a balance between studio, one, two and three bedroom units 
within a building even where market demand does not support the optimality of such a 
mix. The PAUP rules only apply to developments with 10 or more units in the mixed 
housing zone and 20 or more units in the terraced house and apartment block and 
central city zones. 
Information provided by the developers’ survey implies that Council imposed 
requirements on the mix of typologies increases the costs by $100 to $250 per square 
metre (or $6,000 to $15,000 for a 60 square metre apartment). 
 
Balcony sizes 
Balcony size requirements were identified as an issue by developers focused on 
developing affordable apartments.  Information provided by the survey of developers 
implies that the full cost (including opportunity costs) of a balcony is similar to the cost of 
enclosed space. Thus an increase or decrease in the balcony size, assuming it 
increases the area of the apartment (internal and balcony combined), will have a direct 
impact on the cost per apartment. Consequently, the minimum balcony size regulations 
reduce the number of units within an apartment building for a given land area.   
     32 
Information provided by the developers’ survey demonstrated that balcony size 
requirements increased modelled costs by $40,000 to $70,000 per unit (assuming a 
range in balcony deck sizes of 5 to 8 square metres).  The costs are influenced by the 
average deck size across the development. 
 
Floor area requirements and room sizes 
The current restrictions on the size of apartments and room sizes were seen by 
developers as an impediment to providing affordable housing, particularly within the 
CBD.  Rather than increasing the cost of a unit that exceeds the minimum size, the 
restrictions on floor area result in fewer low cost dwellings being developed. Anecdotal 
evidence, however, suggests that there is demand from both investors and occupiers for 
the smaller units.   
Removal of floor area restrictions would directly reduce the cost of a dwelling unit 
affecting by the restriction (albeit also reducing one aspect of apartment quality, i.e. the 
floor area).  However it is important to note that the total cost of a unit is not proportional 
to apartment size, with the rate per square metre being higher for smaller units.  A large 
proportion of the higher cost per square metre for smaller units reflects the fixed costs 
associated with the bathroom and kitchen being spread over a smaller area. 
 
Unit Orientation 
Unit orientation (e.g. positioning requirements relative to the sun)  influences building 
development layouts and yields.  We were unable to source any definitive data which 
could be used to model the impact that this has on the cost per dwelling unit within an 
apartment development or sub-division.  The impact is likely to vary significantly across 
different sites with the shape, area and orientation of the site having a significant impact 
on the overall cost implication. 
 
Green star ratings 
Green star requirements provide a challenge for developers trying to incorporate 
additional features into their developments whilst trying to control costs, maintain 
margins and still have a marketable product.  Developers were not able to provide a 
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large amount of information on the cost of achieving different levels of green star ratings.  
Developers targeting the mid to upper end of the market were confident that their 
product already achieved good green star ratings (although they had not been rated) 
whilst developers targeting the more affordable end of the market saw any green star 
requirements as an additional cost.  
The operative district plans do not include any green star rating requirements.  However 
the PAUP requires new buildings to meet the 6 Homestar certification established by the 
New Zealand Green Building Council. (These rules are currently being applied in the 
SHAs.) 
 The best cost data provided implied that green star ratings would add between $4,500 
and $7,500 per unit to a dwelling that was already well designed.  This would be a 1% to 
1.5% increase relative to the dwelling’s sale price. 
 
Infrastructure contributions (reserve, development and Watercare) 
Developers have typically paid infrastructure contributions in the past through a variety 
of mechanisms.  However, they think that increasingly Watercare and Auckland 
Transport are engaging in monopolistic behaviour to force them to fund upgrades and 
the expansion of infrastructure where the benefits extend beyond the boundaries of their 
development, the costs of which are not being offset by reductions in either development 
contributions or Watercare levies.  The overall sentiment from developers is that 
Watercare contributions have been consistently escalating and are now $12,500 a 
connection.  Developers consider that they are paying for a lack of past investment.22   
Information provided by the developers’ survey demonstrated that infrastructure 
contributions that pertain to matters that extend beyond the development increased 
modelled costs by $10,100 to $21,250 per unit. The increase in costs reflects the 
expenditure over and above what was required for the subject development.  For 
                                                
22 We make no judgement as to whether the developers’ concerns are accurate in this respect, or whether 
current Watercare charges are too high, too low or are broadly correct.  
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example, in some cases developers are asked to incorporate storm water schemes 
servicing the whole catchment whereas their property forms only part of the catchment.23 
 
Infrastructure design considerations 
A number of developers (both apartment and non-apartment) commented that 
infrastructure requirements were over-designed and lack innovation.  This resulted in 
increased costs to the developer.  No definitive data was available on the impact that 
this had on development and infrastructure contributions.  Consequently, it is difficult to 
estimate the impact on the cost per dwelling.   
 
Section sizes 
Council imposed section size requirements can have a range of different effects in 
different locations.  Information provided by the developers’ survey implies that Council 
imposed requirements on section sizes may increase cost by $11,000 to $19,000 per 
section.  The additional costs accumulate in two ways.  First, in some instances they 
force the developer to sell sections that are not the preferred market size, thereby 
increasing the sales period.  Second, in some instances, they limit the number of 
sections a developer can subdivide within a development. 
 
Site coverage and green space 
Developers’ perceptions are that the current planning process limits the level of 
innovation in development design.  For example, it is far easier to undertake a traditional 
infill development than come up with an innovative design that achieves higher density 
and lower site coverage ratios with more private green space.   
Information provided by the developers implies that Council imposed requirements on 
site coverage and green space may increase cost by $5,000 to $10,000 per unit. 
 
                                                
23 In such cases, the costs of providing the capacity to service the storm water from the catchment area that 
they do not own is incorporated in our cost estimates whilst the cost of servicing storm water from within 
their development is excluded. 
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Other urban design considerations 
Developers provided detailed comments about the impact of urban designers on their 
development proposals.  The majority of comments about the (external) urban design 
panel were complementary (a view held by over 70% of respondents); however almost 
without exception Council’s urban design staff were considered inexperienced and a 
hindrance to innovation and to the provision of marketable residential solutions.   
Information provided by the developers’ survey implies that Council imposed urban 
design requirements increase the length of time required to gain a consent, increase the 
costs of the planning process as designs need to be reworked multiple times, reduce the 
saleability of the units within the development and increase the costs as developers 
attempt to conform.  Estimates of the impact of urban design input into projects suggest 
that they increase costs by $9,500 to $20,000 per dwelling.  Note that these cost 
estimates exclude the rules discussed separately in this section.  The factors covered in 
these estimates include decreased yield due to design changes such as limiting rear 
sections, road layouts and increased infrastructure costs due to the requirements to 
have roads on all reserve boundaries. 
 
Car parking requirements 
There were diverse views of the impact of car parking requirements on developments, 
reflecting differing development types.  CBD apartment developers, particularly those 
developing at the affordable end of the market, prefer to include fewer car parks.  They 
saw car parks as a cost to the development as the market value of a park was less than 
the cost of including them on the development. In contrast to CBD apartment 
developers’ views, suburban apartment developers tended to favour offering more car 
parks (as indicated by their comments in Appendix 2). Insufficient information was 
provided by developers to accurately assess the impact of car parking requirements on 
development costs and profitability although some comments suggested that the net 
cost/loss per car park in a CBD development was approximately $32,000. We note that 
minimum parking requirements were removed from the city centre in the late 1990s and 
the PAUP further removes minimum parking requirements in some other areas. 
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Heritage controls and tree protection 
A number of the projects included in the survey were developments which incorporated 
heritage buildings (e.g. older villas) and protected trees.  Developers’ perceptions were 
that Council was inflexible in its consideration of these issues.  Consequently, these 
features resulted in a loss of development capacity and more complex design to 
integrate the trees or buildings into the development’s design.   
Information provided by the developers’ survey implies Council imposed requirements in 
relation to the retention of heritage buildings such as villas and protected trees can 
increase the costs by $5,600 to $9,800 per dwelling.24 
 
Building Consents 
The building consent process can impact on development cost in a number of ways.  
First, delays around issuing the building consent can impact on building design and 
increase the length of the planning process.  These delays can relate to a number of 
design issues already discussed such as site coverage ratios, minimum floor and 
balcony areas, floor to ceiling heights, and urban design considerations.   
Second, the compliance inspections associated with the construction of the building can 
add delays.  Building inspections need to be booked in advance and builders need to 
anticipate the timing of the inspections relative to progress on site. This system offers 
greater certainty to developers over the timing of inspections than a system without 
bookings. However, if developers allow insufficient time to complete a stage and the 
inspector visits the site in line with the original booking, the building timeline may be 
disrupted whilst the construction activity catches up, sub-contractors are reorganised, 
and the inspection is rebooked. This may add a number of weeks to the build process 
and increase the overall costs.  Builders are faced with a balancing act of managing the 
timelines so that inspectors visit the site as key construction milestones are reached 
whilst not allowing too much of a buffer for unexpected delays so that key staff and 
contractors are not idle. 
                                                
24 We note that the blanket requirements for resource consents for tree removal have been removed from 
the PAUP and from the operative plans.  This is likely to reduce the impact of tree protection by reducing the 
number of affected sites. The heritage controls remain in place. 
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Loss of potential development capacity 
One effect of the application of Council imposed rules and regulations can be a 
significant loss in potential development capacity.  We summarise the loss in capacity 
between the developer’s proposed outcome and the eventual consented outcome in 
Figure 3.25  The figure presents the impact that Council rules and regulations had on 
development capacity (the number of units included in the development) measured 
across all our interviews.  The outcome is expressed as the percentage change in units 
relative to the number of units that would have been developed under the counterfactual 
(proposed) design. Again, the figures only relate to developments that proceeded; they 
do not include developments that did not proceed.26 
 
Figure 3:  Loss in Development Capacity 
 
 
 
                                                
25 In some cases developers applied for more capacity than was allowable. This may possibly have been 
part of a bargaining strategy with Council in which the developers expected Council to counter with a 
response that would include less capacity than was allowable. In one case, a developer was required to 
develop at a higher capacity than they considered optimal for the market. 
26 Note, the data in figure 3 is based on developers’ responses to how rules and regulations 
influenced design of their actual developments compared to the counterfactual market scenarios, 
and consequently differs to developers’ responses to survey question 2 on page 44. 
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The median loss in capacity was 22% of units.  For apartment buildings the loss of 
capacity was primarily due to height restrictions or issues relating to view shafts.  In 
other developments the loss in capacity related to issues associated with urban design 
requirements, retention of heritage building and protected trees, and the need to provide 
on-site infrastructure over and above what was required to service the development’s 
requirements.  In one case the developer was required to increase the density over and 
above what they considered to be the market optimum.   
 
Length of the planning process  
Developers consider that the length of the planning process and the way in which 
Council staff and related agencies engage with developers increases the uncertainty and 
the time required to obtain resource and building consents.   
Information provided by the developers’ survey implies that delays with the consenting 
process can be a significant cost and can vary significantly depending on the individual 
project’s consent application.  In the more extreme cases the delay in obtaining consent 
added more than 3% to the total costs associated with the project.  These reflect the 
additional holding costs associated with the lengthened consenting period.  
 
4.5 Other Issues 
The survey identified a number of other issues relevant to this project, two of which we 
highlight here.   
Developers felt that there has been a lack of alignment between the Council’s (planning) 
goals/plans and those of the related Council agencies (parks and reserves, Auckland 
Transport, urban design, Watercare).  This has resulted in developers trying to mediate 
disputes over how the development should be designed between different parts of 
Council.   In addition, they held the view that there was little or no accountability or 
pressure on Council staff to seek to resolve inter-departmental differences.  
Consequently, developers felt that this process was dysfunctional with no-one within 
Council balancing/arbitrating the contradictory demands by different parts of the 
organisation and the related Council controlled organisations (CCOs). One exception to 
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this lack of coordination was in the case of Special Housing Areas (SHAs), discussed 
further below. 
Over the last two years development land values have appreciated. Developers’ 
perceptions were that purchasers had acquired the land as a medium to long term 
investment with little intention of developing the sites in the near term. An economic 
interpretation of this behaviour is that this implies that it will become more profitable to 
develop that land in future than at present (e.g. because market prices are expected to 
escalate, or costs to diminish). The escalation of land values in the central city makes it 
considerably harder to develop apartments in affordable price ranges.  In 2012, CBD 
development sites sold for around $5,000 to $6,000 per square metre.  In 2013, prices 
had escalated to $10,000 to $12,000 per square metre.  A recent sale on Elliot Street 
was at $18,000 per square metre.  Although there are some locational differences, the 
escalation in values increases the land value component associated with each 
unit/apartment developed unless the sites are more intensively developed.  In these 
circumstances, it is important that planning rules and regulations are conducive to 
intensive developments if affordable apartments are to be offered to the market. 
 
4.6 Special housing areas (SHAs) 
Although the impact of the rules, regulations and processes associated with Auckland’s 
special housing areas were not specifically included in the project’s scope, developers 
provided a range of perspectives on the SHAs. Key points were as follows: 
 The majority of respondents felt council officers responsible for 
administering the process associated with special housing areas were 
useful in assisting to resolve internal design conflicts between different 
parts of Council and related CCOs.  However a limited number of 
developers have had difficulties progressing their applications within a 
SHA due to issues in dealing with the Council; 
 Developments proceeding under the special housing area process have 
to use the proposed unitary plan rules and regulations rather than those 
set out in the previous operative plan.  In a small number of locations this 
means that the development density (number of units per hectare) 
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relative to the optimal development has to be reduced making it less 
attractive to proceed as part of the SHA; 
 Affordable housing criteria under the special housing areas are seen as 
an additional cost to developers and makes SHAs less attractive;  
 Some developers did not want to be first to proceed with a development 
within a SHA and would rather progress their resource consent under the 
rules and regulations that they and their consultants are familiar with.  
This means they feel that they are better able to manage the risks and 
uncertainty associated with their proposals. 
 
4.7 Impact of rules and regulations on affordable housing 
Developers’ views were that affordable housing projects did not receive any special 
treatment that is not available to other developers.  In some cases, developers felt that 
they may even face additional challenges gaining planning consent if their proposal 
includes innovative solutions that are not typically included in other developments. 
Specifically, developers considered that being innovative in order to reduce cost 
heightens the risk and uncertainty when trying to obtain a consent, both in terms of the 
time required to work through the consenting process and the ultimate outcome in terms 
of the number of dwellings. Developers commented that urban designers do not like 
small uniform dwellings which are easy to produce and which reduce costs. 
Developers reported that existing planning rules and regulations impact on affordable 
housing by imposing controls which add costs to the development.  For example, 
requiring balconies on apartments, controlling minimum apartment floor areas, and 
restricting the density of developments are all likely to impact on the cost of affordable 
dwellings. Similarly, development, reserve and Watercare contributions all add to the 
cost, reducing affordability of dwellings. 
 
 
 
     41 
4.8 Developer business strategies 
The survey identified a range of business strategies adopted by developers.  These 
were in part associated with their business philosophy around dealing with the 
uncertainty and risk associated with development. 
Typically, developers undertake a pre-purchase high level feasibility before trying to gain 
control over the site.  This determines the broad parameters of the development 
potential of the site.  This filtering technique reduces the number of projects that are 
abandoned by developers.   
There are two extremes in business models that developers adopt.  These are the 
‘complying’ and the ‘non-complying’ developer.  There is a significant number of 
strategies in between these two extremes. 
‘Complying’ developers normally have conditional control over the site.  They incorporate 
the majority of Council’s feedback into the proposed design of their development, 
estimate the costs, add their margins and estimate their ability to sell the units in the 
current market.  If the development metrics are positive they proceed with the 
development.  Otherwise they abandon the development.  Conversely, ‘non-complying’ 
developers adopt a more aggressive consenting strategy and prepare their resource 
consent application with the expectation that it will eventually go to the Environment 
Court. Again their eventual choice of whether to proceed or not with a development 
comes down to whether their expected risk-adjusted return is sufficiently high to make 
the development worthwhile (after receiving the Environment Court decision). 
 
4.9 Retirement village developers  
A number of retirement village developers were included in the survey.  Retirement 
village operators have been one of the more successful low cost housing developers 
that have developed a range of medium density suburban sites in Auckland and other 
centres.  Retirement village developers typically have a non-compliant development 
business model and will use their resources to drive towards outcomes that they want.   
In comparing their experiences with other developers, we found that retirement village 
operators’ experiences are not dissimilar to other developers. In particular, they found 
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council-imposed height limits to be an issue and found requirements imposed by 
council’s urban designers to be onerous and often impractical in terms of the market.  
However retirement village operators are long term holders of their development which 
appears to assist them in the consenting process.  Their use of corporate balance 
sheets and their willingness to use industry expertise and to challenge the council in the 
Environment Court tends to drive successful consent outcomes.  
 
4.10 Uncertainty considerations 
The business strategy adopted by the developer impacts on the amount of time required 
to complete the consenting process.  The ‘complying’ developer will minimise the 
consenting timeframe; however, there may be significant cost in terms of incorporating 
all Council officers’ preferences in the development’s design, potentially producing a 
suboptimal product in terms of market demand.  Conversely, the ‘non-complying’ 
developer is prepared to work with longer timeframes with less certain outcomes.  
Developers adopting this approach are typically well capitalised to ensure that they have 
the resources required to carry the upfront development costs for a number of years.  
Within the sample of developments included in the project, there were some which have 
changed ownership more than once as developers failed, in part, because of the time 
taken during the planning process.  The delays in the process are not always the result 
of Council’s actions. 
In this section of the report, we provide an overview of the development and planning 
process in order to discuss issues that result in the greatest uncertainty in terms of 
development outcomes.  In addition, we discuss some of the timeframes involved. The 
various steps in a development include: 
 A potential development site is offered to a developer; 
 Prior to any formal meetings with Council staff, developers may engage 
with their consultants and Council officers to discuss the development’s 
concept and what is feasible on the site, prior to purchasing or gaining 
control of the site; 
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 A significant number of projects are abandoned at this stage, for a 
number of reasons.  These include: the asking price and/or market value 
of the land is too high relative to the number of units that can be 
developed on the property; the planning issues associated with the 
property are such that the risk/reward equation is unbalanced; issues 
over access to infrastructure (three waters and transport/roading) and or 
the cost of upgrading the existing infrastructure is too great; or market 
demand is insufficient to support the development; 
 Assuming the developer decides to proceed, typically some form of 
control over the site is negotiated.  Initial concepts of the proposed 
development are completed, taking into account what the market could 
support and the existing planning environment.  Decisions around 
whether to propose a complying or non-complying development will be 
made.  The level of uncertainty over the consents outcome increases if 
the non-complying strategy is adopted; 
 The developer and their consultants may meet informally with Council 
staff again to discuss the proposal or go straight to a pre-application 
meeting.  The goal of these meetings is to manage the risk and 
uncertainty associated with the project by identifying possible design 
related issues so that solutions can be agreed prior to the consent being 
lodged; 
 Council delivers their feedback on the project’s design via the planning 
department.  This often includes conflicting advice from different parts of 
Council and their agencies.  Typically the developer is left to resolve 
these issues.  This can be a time consuming process.  In some cases the 
differing views between the parts of Council can be based on different 
philosophies in terms of how the property should be developed.  
Developers think Council staff are under no internal pressures to resolve 
their differences.  This can significantly increase the amount of time 
involved in this part of the process.  Non-complying developers 
sometimes skip this stage knowing that they will eventually have these 
issues resolved by the Environment Court; 
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 The developer lodges the resource consent detailing the precinct design 
and incorporates the feedback from Council staff.  Developers’ 
perceptions are that Council staff, particularly urban designers, get 
focused on the detail and go beyond their remit in terms of the Resource 
Management Act; 
 Requests for additional information on the consent typically delay the 
processing of the application; 
 Once the resource consent has been granted, detailed work required for 
the earthworks and other civil works can be completed along with the 
subdivision consent. 
Key areas which cause uncertainty in this process include: 
 Council staff may agree solutions to issues associated with a 
development during pre-application meetings, and then change their view 
once the consent application has been lodged.  Consequently, issues 
associated with a project may have to be re-litigated multiple times which 
results in lost time and multiple redesigns; 
 Negotiating issues relating to key infrastructure can be challenging with 
the agencies under no pressure to agree solutions. Developers think that 
both Watercare and Auckland Transport use this process to get the 
developer to fund infrastructure over and above what their individual 
project would require; 
 Developers think that the concept of “best practice” is a continually 
evolving concept particularly with urban designers.  Engaging with these 
staff members takes time particularly since they have a limited concept of 
the marketability of the changes they propose; 
 Resolving the differences between Council staff and their agencies; 
 Council staff seem to lack urgency particularly around processing 
consents prior to the start of the earthworks season. 
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In addition, developers think too much weight is placed on concerns from people who 
own properties in the surrounding area.  They think Council should focus on the issues 
and the impact of the development rather than the voices of what may be a vocal 
minority.  Cities need to continually evolve to remain relevant.  A recent comment, typical 
of existing residents trying to preserve their existing environment at the expense of the 
wider community, appeared in the New Zealand Herald: 
The Grey Lynn Residents Association, which has a number of heritage 
and special character state homes in its neighbourhood, were 
dismayed at the corporation's submission. "We are empathetic to 
Housing NZ's wish to house more people ... [but] the heritage overlay 
is absolutely critical to the fabric of Grey Lynn," said spokeswoman 
Nicola Legat.  Lynne Butler, Freemans Bay Residents Association co-
chair, said: "To start pepper-potting [properties in] Freemans Bay will 
have a huge impact on the character of the streets." – (NZ Herald 11th 
July 2014). 
 
Developers think Council struggles with the conflict between their stated desire to 
intensify residential development in the existing urban area and the resistance from 
residents to change in their suburbs. As a consequence, Council tends to have a 
preference for notifying non-complying consents even when the effects are relatively 
minor.  This increases the uncertainty with consent applications. 
 
4.11 Development uncertainty 
In the second section of the survey, respondents were asked a series of questions 
specifically designed to elicit developers’ views of the impacts of uncertainty on the 
development of new dwellings.  The questions and responses are included below.27 
 
Question 1:  Is/was your choice of development affected by whether or not it 
required notification under the existing planning rules and regulations? 
 Yes – avoid consent applications which require notification - (69% of 
responses); 
 No – (31% of responses). 
Question 2:  How was your project affected? 
 Increased time to gain consent and higher costs - (44% of responses); 
                                                
27 For some questions, developers could give multiple responses; in these cases, totals do not add to 100%. 
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 Reduced development capacity - (6% of responses); 
 Had to be flexible in the design to accommodate Council’s requests - 
(25% of responses); 
 Had to change to a suboptimal design to comply with the consent - (13% 
of responses). 
Question 3:  Was your choice affected by the potential time taken to deliver the 
project to fruition? 
 Yes - (81% of responses); 
 No - (19% of responses). 
Question 4:  If so, which choices did you make to reduce project length, and what 
differences did those make to the development? 
 Staged the project - (31% of responses);  
 Did not proceed with the development after the initial concepts - (6% of 
responses); 
 Staged the consenting process - (25% of responses); 
 Tried to engage with and communicate with Council on an ongoing basis 
- (38% of responses); 
 Hired the best consultants - (25% of responses); 
 Prepared consent with the expectation of going to the environment court 
- (13% of responses). 
Question 5:  Is/was your choice of development affected by the degree of 
uncertainty over the expected development period)? 
 Yes - (88% of responses); 
 No - (12% of responses). 
Question 6:  If the potential project length and other uncertainties caused you to 
abandon one or more projects, what was the cause? 
 Market conditions – (88% of responses); 
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 Issues around the consenting process  - (88% of responses); 
 Urban design changes – (25% of responses); 
 Availability of infrastructure – (13% of responses). 
Question 7:  How did you manage these uncertainties and their effects? 
 Maximise pre-sales – (44% of responses); 
 Consultation/have good communication /engage with Council – (94% of 
responses); 
 Have a high amount of equity - (38% of responses); 
 Be flexible and comply with Council’s every wish (19% of responses); 
 Select sites carefully – (63% of responses); 
 Employ the best consultants – (38% of responses). 
Question 8:  Did the potential project length and uncertainties cause you to 
abandon one or more projects? 
 Yes – (100% of responses); 
 No – (0% of responses); 
 Defer the project until conditions improve - (28% of responses). 
Question 9:  If so which were the dominant factors influencing the abandonment? 
 Zoning issues28 – too few units possible within the development – (88% 
of developments); 
 Zoning issues – surrounding land owner issues (63% of responses); 
 The cost of providing infrastructure – roading and three waters – (38% of 
responses); 
                                                
28 Zoning issues may impact on uncertainty if the development is non-complying making outcomes from the 
resource consent process less certain. Developers note that pre-application meetings sometimes raise 
issues with the proposed development that heighten uncertainty over the final outcome of a consent, 
causing the developer to abandon a project. 
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 Zoning issues – height restrictions - (38% of responses); 
 Adverse market conditions – (44% of responses). 
Question 10:  Where you did proceed with a project, did the project length and 
uncertainties affect: 
 The final sale price – (0% of responses); 
 Project profitability (88% of responses); 
 Both - (12% of responses). 
Question 11:  Why did the effects come out this way? 
 Increased costs reduced profit – cannot pass on high costs in the short 
term – (63% of responses); 
 Delays in proceeding with the project meant that the units were sold in a 
different market environment - (75% of responses); 
 Consent costs were much higher than expected which reduced profit – 
(19% of responses); 
 Increased project length also increased holding/finance costs reducing 
profit – (69% of responses). 
 
4.12 Survey Summary 
In summary, Council’s planning rules and regulations, together with the ways in which 
Council and CCO staff apply them and interact with developers, have added significant 
cost and uncertainty to residential developments.  Furthermore, planning rules and 
regulations reduce the potential development capacity of projects. 
It is beyond the scope of this project to determine the reasonableness of Council’s 
approach in terms of whether the benefits of their approach more than offset the costs 
(including uncertainty) imposed on developers.  This is an issue more appropriately 
considered by Local and Central Government.  Of concern are developers’ views about 
Council’s internal urban design process, its subjectivity, and that it is being used to drive 
personal preferences rather than compliance with planning rules and regulations.  A 
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clear definition of the interrelationship between urban design and planning rules appears 
to be required.  In addition, the way in which Council processes resource consents and 
manages the feedback from the different parts of their organisation is in need of 
clarification.  It seems unreasonable to expect developers to mediate differences 
between the various parts of Council and CCOs on a development.    
Council’s goal of a compact city appears to be compromised by rules and regulations 
that reduce the development capacity of brownfield sites.  Developers’ views were that 
height limits, balcony requirements, floor to ceiling height requirements, increased 
number of view shafts, minimum dwelling floor areas, and desired dwelling mixes 
(number of bedrooms) all impact on development capacity.  Furthermore, developers 
think that Council places too much weight on concerns from people who own properties 
in a surrounding area and that Council should focus on the issues and the impact of the 
development rather than the voices of what may be a vocal minority.   
All the issues raised in this report impact on developers’ costs, profitability, risks and 
uncertainty and hence on their ability to increase the supply of Auckland’s housing stock.  
Initially, developers absorb a significant proportion of unexpected cost levied throughout 
the development process.  However, in subsequent projects, these costs and issues of 
uncertainty will inevitably be encapsulated into their costings which are reflected in the 
prices that need to be achieved to generate developers’ required rates of return.  At the 
same time, the cost of development land has not responded (downwards) to the 
increase in costs; rather land values have continued to escalate, possibly indicating 
increased potential development profits through future (rather than current) 
development.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Conceptually, dwelling prices are determined in the long run by the total costs of a 
development, where costs include costs of delay and uncertainty. When prices exceed 
costs (e.g. in the short run during housing booms) developers bring forth new supply, 
while the housing stock stagnates when costs exceed the market price. Costs imposed 
by Council regulation and/or by delays and uncertainties in the development process, 
have the effect of raising long run costs, and hence market prices, as the cost impacts of 
each of these elements is built into a developer’s initial calculations regarding a 
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prospective development. In the short run, an unexpected cost is unlikely to be reflected 
materially in the market price of a dwelling since that market price is essentially already 
determined by supply and demand of the type of dwelling. As other developers come to 
reflect these costs in their own development calculations, however, the costs feed 
through fully to dwelling prices. 
We show that extra development costs do not only result from explicit regulatory policies 
such as minimum stud heights. Regulatory practices, affecting uncertainty over 
consenting outcomes and delays in the consenting and development process, also 
reduce the likelihood that a developer will proceed with a project at either the initial stage 
(i.e. when deciding whether to apply for consents) or following a successful consenting 
outcome. In the latter case, the longer the time taken to process the consent, the greater 
is the likelihood that market conditions will have changed adversely so causing a project 
to be abandoned. The likelihood of abandonment increases both where the consenting 
timeframe lengthens and where the outcome of the consents is less certain. 
Overall, if new supply is constrained in the face of extra demand, market prices will rise 
and eventually the rise in price will reflect the increments to total development costs 
(including costs of uncertainty and delay). Thus an important mechanism that raises the 
price of dwelling units is through restrictions of supply as a result of raised costs. 
The results of our developer survey for Auckland, concentrating on the ‘affordable’ end 
of the market, confirm these conceptual predictions. All the surveyed developers stated 
that they had abandoned one or more projects as a result of expected project length 
and/or uncertainties. Almost 90% of our survey respondents stated that delays and 
uncertainties related to a project that did proceed had the effect of reducing profits but 
did not affect the final sale price of units in the development; the remainder saw some 
effect on each of profits and sale prices. However, because of the effect of the extra 
costs on future developments, we can conclude that prices, and the types of 
development, are affected by additional Council-related costs. 
Table 2 listed the effects of Council-related actions on development costs per dwelling. 
Some of the cost elements are relatively minor; however, some have major effects. In 
particular, for apartments, building height limits and balcony requirements can each have 
cost impacts of over $30,000 per apartment; conforming to Council’s desired mix of 
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typologies and increased minimum floor to ceiling heights (in affordable apartments)  can 
each add over $10,000 per apartment. For residential sections and standalone 
dwellings, elements that can raise costs by at least $15,000 include: infrastructure 
contributions that are not directly related to a specific development, section size 
requirements, extended consent processes and other urban design considerations 
(stemming, in particular, from Council’s urban designers). Reserve and development 
contributions and Watercare levies affect the costs of both types of development. A 
range of other elements can cause lesser, but still material, cost increases per dwelling. 
In some cases, the extra costs cause developers to substitute a different development 
type for the preferred option. In other cases, a developer may abandon a prospective 
development altogether if prospective costs (including potential delays and uncertainties) 
are prohibitive in relation to the expected sale price. Indeed, all of our respondents 
stated that they had abandoned one or more projects as a result of potential project 
length and uncertainties. In these cases, there is no observable extra cost that can be 
derived from development calculations, since there is no observed development. In 
particular, developers report that an outcome of binding minimum floor area 
requirements for apartments is the development of fewer affordable dwellings.  
More generally, Council imposed rules and regulations result in a significant loss in 
potential development capacity.  The median loss in capacity was 22% (for 
developments that proceeded).  For apartment buildings, the loss of capacity was 
primarily due to height restrictions or issues relating to view shafts. In other 
developments the loss in capacity related to issues associated with urban design 
requirements, retention of heritage building and protected trees, and the need to provide 
on-site infrastructure over and above what was required to service the developments’ 
requirements. Research by Grimes and Hyland (2014, op. cit.) shows that a 1% 
reduction in the dwelling stock (relative to population) leads to a 2.2% price increase in 
order to equate demand with (the reduced) supply. Thus restrictions on development 
capacity, plus the effects of uncertainties and delays force up dwelling prices by curbing 
dwelling supply.  
Our survey results are based on a detailed survey of 16 developers active in the 
Auckland area, some with multiple developments. While picked to reflect currently active 
Auckland developers, the relatively small numbers involved mean that we cannot 
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attribute any statistical significance to the figures obtained. The cost intervals indicated 
in Table 2 cover the reported effects of the cost attributes across the various developers’ 
total costs of development per dwelling. The broad consistency of results across 
developers (and in relation to their responses to the questions regarding uncertainty and 
delay) indicates that the cost ranges in Table 2 provide a reasonable starting point for 
assessing the long run dwelling price effects of various Council rules, regulations and 
actions.  
Excluding the cost of Watercare and reserve and development contributions, the typical 
range of the total impact varied between $32,500 and $60,000 per dwelling in a 
subdivision.  In terms of affordable apartments, assuming the total internal floor area 
remains the same and no deck is built, the impact on total cost typically ranges between 
$65,000 to $110,000.  The majority of the cost relates to height limits on the building and 
the required balcony area. These estimates assume that no stud height restrictions are 
imposed. Furthermore, an increase in supply of more affordable apartments could be 
achieved by reducing the existing minimum allowable floor area of the units. We do not 
separately assess the benefits derived from these elements, but our estimates present a 
basis for others to compare the benefits of certain elements and so decide whether the 
extra costs are warranted or not. 
Notwithstanding how these cost/benefit calculations proceed, two process improvements 
that could reduce costs without obvious negative benefit implications are: (a) to confine 
Council’s urban design input regarding developments to the external interface of the 
development with its environment; and (b) for Council to coordinate responses by 
various arms of Council plus CCOs before responding to developers with a consistent 
set of requirements when considering a development application. These 
recommendations, and the cost information, are designed to provide evidence for 
interpreting whether changes can be made by local and/or central government that could 
reduce the price of affordable housing, especially in Auckland. We leave it to those 
whose decisions affect these costs to consider our results and to consider whether 
changes can or should be made to reduce costs where those costs currently outweigh 
the benefits that may result from their imposition.  
____  
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Appendix 1: Sample Hypothetical Development Spreadsheets 
Greenfields Development Costs* Base case Scenario 1 
 
Stormwater servicing for 
own site only 
Stormwater servicing for 
whole catchment 
Number of sections 277 units   250 units   
  
 
  
 
  
Land 
 
$14,280,000 
 
$14,280,000 
Pre Construction Costs 
 
  
 
  
Civils & legal 
 
$329,000 
 
$329,000 
Property Costs 
 
  
 
  
Rates $163,000   $166,000   
Utilities $20,000 $183,000 $21,000 $187,000 
Professional Fees 
 
  
 
  
Urban Design, planning, traffic  $687,000   $698,000   
Other consultants $1,469,000   $1,492,000   
Beacon assessment of design $41,000   $41,000   
Project management $326,000   $331,000   
Management/governance $224,000 $2,747,000 $228,000 $2,790,000 
Civil Construction 
 
  
 
  
Civils stage 1 - contract price  $17,544,000   $16,851,000   
Landscaping $3,400,000   $3,315,000   
Utilities - Vector $884,000 $21,828,000 $794,000 $20,960,000 
Build Form 
 
  
 
  
Construction costs 
 
$90,630,000 
 
$81,796,029 
Other costs 
 
  
 
  
RMA & Consent Fees $575,000   $575,000   
Watercare  $4,148,000   $3,729,000   
Development Contributions $9,665,000 $14,388,000 $9,250,000 $13,554,000 
Sales 
 
  
 
  
Marketing $408,000   $387,000   
Agents fees $2,026,000   $1,809,000   
Legal fees - conveyancing $415,000   $373,000   
Valuations/sales $230,000 $3,079,000 $207,000 $2,776,000 
Funding and Insurance 
 
  
 
  
Financial services $754,000   $766,000   
Facility set up $379,000   $385,000   
Interest and fees $2,938,000   $2,624,000   
Insurance $299,000 $4,370,000 $303,000 $4,078,000 
Contingency 
 
  
 
  
Contingency 
 
$3,033,000 
 
$2,762,000 
  
 
$154,867,000 
 
$143,512,029 
Impact _difference 
 
  
 
  
Original Cost per unit 
 
  
 
$559,087 
Cost per unit reduced number of units 
 
  
 
$574,048 
Additional cost per unit       $14,961 
* Sub-totals and totals are included on the right hand side of each column. 
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High Rise Apartment Development Costs Base Case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3*  
 
Base Costs 
Height limit 
reducing the no. 
of floors 
Increasing floor 
to ceiling height 
(2.4m to 2.7m) 
No decks with 1 
extra apartment 
per floor 
     
  
With 4 fewer 
floors & 
Same building 
height with a  
29 additional 
apartments 
  
 a reduction of 32 
apartments 
reduction of 22 
apartments 
with no decks 
     
Land Costs $14,490,000 $14,490,000 $14,490,000 $14,490,000 
Fees         
Consultants $4,720,000 $4,720,000 $4,720,000 $4,720,000 
Council Costs         
Development contributions & Watercare $3,570,000 $3,060,000 $3,180,000 $3,990,000 
Consent costs etc. $380,000 $380,000 $380,000 $380,000 
 $3,950,000 $3,440,000 $3,560,000 $4,370,000 
Construction Costs         
Demolition $400,000 $400,000 $400,000 $400,000 
Construction costs $49,760,000 $43,870,000 $48,510,000 $50,195,000 
Total  $50,160,000 $44,270,000 $48,910,000 $50,595,000 
Finance Costs         
Interest & fees $1,540,000 $1,370,000 $1,470,000 $1,530,000 
Other costs (insurance, setup etc.) $580,000 $580,000 $580,000 $580,000 
 $2,120,000 $1,950,000 $2,050,000 $2,110,000 
Contingency $1,100,000 $1,050,000 $1,150,000 $1,200,000 
Sale Costs $2,380,000 $2,260,000 $2,290,000 $2,660,000 
Total costs excluding GST & margin $78,920,000 $72,180,000 $77,170,000 $80,145,000 
         
Number of apartments 244 212 222 273 
Costs excl GST and developer's margin         
Cost per apartment $323,000 $340,000 $348,000 $294,000 
Cost ($psm) $5,873 $6,182 $6,382 $5,880 
Cost implication against base scenario 0% 5% 9% -9% 
Costs incl GST and developer's margin         
Cost per apartment $464,000 $489,000 $498,000 $423,000 
Cost ($psm) $8,400 $8,900 $9,200 $8,500 
Difference ($psm) $0 $500 $800 $100 
Difference per unit $0 $25,000 $34,000 -$41,000 
* Scenario 3 models a relaxation of an existing constraint, so the modelled result is shown as a cost saving 
rather than as the imposition of an extra cost as for the increased constraints in scenarios 1 and 2. 
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Appendix 2: Representative Developers’ Comments 
Intensification – height limits 
Developers commented: 
 “Height limits have been imposed without consideration of development 
feasibility.  For example the optimal heights for CBD apartment 
complexes range between 20 and 25 levels while the optimal height in 
suburban locations is likely to be between 5 and 8 levels; 
 “Council have increased the number of view shafts across the CBD from 
7 to 40.  This has a significant impact on the development capacity of 
some sites within the CBD”; 
 “Little consideration is given to the actual impact of building height within 
a development and the focus is on imposing the rules.  This is a strongly 
held view particularly in larger developments where higher buildings are 
sited away from boundaries to minimise the impact of bulk on 
surroundings and shading of adjoining properties”;   
 “A clear conflict exists between the stated overall goal of providing a 
compact urban environment and providing the opportunity for developers 
to undertake economically viable developments in locations where 
people want to live”;  
 “Council struggles to cope with allowing apartment developments in 
suburban areas when they attract considerable criticism from existing 
residents who are concerned about the impact on their neighbourhood”; 
 “If the city is to intensify, Council and their officers need to stand up to a 
few outspoken individuals who are resisting change at the expense of the 
wider community.  If Auckland is to evolve into a regional city it must 
provide affordable accommodation where people want to live.  
Apartments and terraced houses are one mechanism to achieve this.  If 
Council is not prepared to create the zones to allow this to happen 
perhaps the zoning should be imposed by central government”; 
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 “Council officers seem to be risk averse and want to notify multi-storey 
developments rather than considering the level of impacts on the 
surrounding community”; and 
 “Consenting authorities and the Environment Court process do not seem 
to appreciate the impact of their decisions on development feasibility.  A 
decision to compromise height between what the developer wants and 
Council officers consider appropriate leads to suboptimal outcomes”. 
Floor to ceiling heights 
Apartment developers commented: 
 “Floor to ceiling height limits do not impact on developments targeting the 
mid to upper end of the market as these typically already include 2.7 
metre gaps.  These purchasers expect the higher stud heights”; 
 “Increasing floor to ceiling heights from 2.4 metres to 2.55 metres or 2.7 
metres makes it difficult to develop affordable apartments and maintain 
developer’s margins.  It also means in some locations a level of 
apartments is lost if the building needs to stay under Council imposed 
height limits”; 
 “Development strategies are based on the bulk/number of apartments 
that can be achieved on a site relative to its price.  When offered a site, 
the bulk/number of apartments that can be achieved on the site 
complying with Council rules is estimated and the quantum of land cost 
per apartment is calculated.  If this fits our feasibility parameters the 
potential of the site is further investigated.  If the minimum floor to ceiling 
height increases, fewer apartments can be built within the allowable 
building envelope.  Fewer apartments mean a reduction in the number of 
sites that can be profitably developed.” 
Non-apartment developers commented: 
  “We have included units with a range of stud heights in our 
developments in the past.  The units have been priced to reflect the 
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different costs.  Potential purchasers typically prefer the higher stud until 
they realise the price implications.  They then opt to buy units with the 
lower stud.” 
 “Council officers, particularly urban designers, are trying to socially 
engineer development outcomes.  They know nothing about the 
economics of developing property.  Do they expect the developers to 
absorb the costs or are they just trying to making housing less 
affordable?” 
Mix of units within an apartment building 
Apartment developers’ comments on the Council officers’ requirements to include a 
certain mix of units within their developments include: 
 “Council officers should stick to the planning rules and not try to socially 
engineer the outcomes from building design.  They know little about what 
will sell and try to get developers to include typologies that there is limited 
or no market for”; 
  “Urban designers are moving beyond their remit.  Their focus should be 
on the building street interface rather than the design within the building”; 
 “The mix of units should be market driven rather than dictated by Council 
staff.  These officials have no idea about the market and what will sell 
and what will not.  They should focus on their job rather than directing 
developers how to do theirs”; 
Retirement village developers commented: 
 “Retirement village developers struggle with Council’s internal urban 
designers.  They appear to want to tell developers how to design their 
villages including the configuration of units.  Council’s urban designers 
have no experience in retirement village development and should not try 
and dictate the typology and number of bedrooms dwellings should have.  
This just increases the time and costs associated with the consent.” 
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Balcony sizes 
Apartment developers commented: 
 “The rules are too inflexible and need to consider how to make the space 
more useable rather than just prescribing sizes.  For example, occupants 
may prefer slightly larger living areas, and smaller deeper decks”; and 
 “The proposed unitary plan is also trying to incorporate balcony 
dimensions as well as sizes.  Restrictions like this are a cost.  
Developers need flexibility to design good outcomes rather than just 
following rules.” 
Floor area requirements and room sizes 
Apartment developers commented: 
 “Smaller units would be developed if possible.  For example, there would 
be strong demand for 20 square metre studio units from investors which 
could sell for $180,000 to $200,000 a unit.  These would rent well for 
$270 to $280 per week and give investors a 10% net return”; and 
 “Reducing the minimum size of a one bedroom apartment by five square 
metres would reduce the price by 8% to 10%.  More flexibility on room 
size restrictions would be required to achieve this.” 
Green star ratings 
Apartment and standalone dwelling developers commented: 
 “There is no standardised green star rating programmes for apartments 
which makes it hard to comply”. 
  “In today’s market, adding sustainability features such as the use of grey 
water all sound good but they do not increase the value of the unit and 
what’s more there is no compensation from Watercare’s infrastructure 
charges to offset the costs.  Features like this just make apartments less 
affordable to purchasers”; and 
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 “Purchasers do not appreciate sustainability features that can be built 
into a building and are not prepared to pay any extra.  They are more 
concerned about the here and now”. 
Infrastructure contributions (reserve, development and Watercare) 
Standalone dwelling developers commented: 
  “Watercare is behaving in a monopolistic manner.  They can charge 
what they like and developers have to pay.  They are now charging 
$2,500 to have a $180 water meter installed.  If we don’t pay, Council will 
not issue a section 224(c) certificate and the sale cannot settle.  
Developers don’t have a choice, these guys are a bunch of robbers”; 
 “Watercare cause us a lot of problems.  Their administration is a 
shambles particularly when it comes to developments with more than one 
dwelling.  They always seem to have problems linking the water meter to 
the right property in their billing systems.  Despite multiple follow ups we 
had one case that took over a year to resolve whilst at the same time 
they were threatening to cut off the dwelling’s water supply.  How could 
they pay if they did not get the invoice”; 
 “Watercare behaves in a monopolistic way charging what they like.  It’s 
not value for money and we could provide onsite solutions cheaper than 
their costs particularly with the level of over specification they require on 
their systems”; 
 “Our development requires us to provide storm water catchment 
ponds/treatment within our development.  We are required to provide 
sufficient capacity for the whole catchment even though we do not own 
all the land within the catchment.  There is no compensation available for 
the capacity over and above what is required for our land.  What makes 
this even more inequitable is that if an adjoining owner now develops 
their land they can make use of our storm water systems at no cost other 
than the standard development costs and Watercare contributions which 
we have to pay as well”; 
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 “We have always had to make contributions to upgrade the roads around 
our developments.  This is now getting out of hand.  Auckland Transport 
appears to have no money to upgrade roads in areas zoned for 
residential development.  They appear to think the developers should 
fund everything.  When you approach them they just say that the 
upgrade of the roading infrastructure is not in their 10 year plan.  If you 
want the development to proceed you have to pay for it yourself with no 
or little offset in development contributions.” 
Section sizes 
Greenfield developers commented: 
 “Council imposed section sizes are forcing me to subdivide sections 
which are too small for the market.  We can still sell them - it just takes a 
lot longer increasing our overall risk”; 
 “The proposed unitary plan has actually increased the minimum section 
sizes in our location.  Our development is included in a special housing 
area (SHA), however, if we tried to utilise the planning process under the 
SHA we would have to develop larger sections”; and 
 “In our consent, Council imposed a requirement that we include a 
number of large sections in our subdivision which has reduced our 
profitability.  We cannot understand the logic associated with their 
decision other than the contour of the land was slightly steeper in the rear 
of our subdivision”. 
Site coverage and green space 
Greenfield and suburban developers commented: 
 “The proposed unitary plan now requires 20 square metres of private 
open space per unit.  This is okay but decreases the yield and increases 
the cost of doing the development”; 
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 “Road layouts within a development have also been significantly 
impacted by urban design input.  Requirements to have road frontages 
along the edge of reserves increases costs.  This means that you can 
only have dwellings along one side of the road which increases roading 
and infrastructure costs.  Rear sections are also increasingly excluded 
from developments again increasing roading costs per lot;” and 
 “Council are too focused on their rules rather than the project’s 
outcomes.  For example what is wrong with redeveloping a site (or a 
number of sites amalgamated together) into a low rise multi storey 
building (two to three storeys) if there is limited or no shading of the 
adjoining properties, and the amount of onsite open green space is 
increased compared to a more traditional town house development.  You 
can more than double the density (number of units from the site) and 
achieve a more affordable product.  The challenge with non-complying 
developments like this is it takes two or more years to get consent and 
there is considerable uncertainty over what will eventually be approved.” 
Other urban design considerations 
Apartment and non-apartment developers commented: 
 “Council’s urban design team are all too inexperienced and very naïve.  
They have no commercial experience and add no value.  Typically they 
quote text book driven solutions at you and are very subjective in 
promoting their personal likes and dislikes. From an urban design point of 
view it’s all about how lucky or unlucky you are in terms of who your 
consent is allocated to.”  This view was expressed by over 90% of the 
developers interviewed;  
 “Although we do not always agree with the outcomes, the Council’s 
external urban design panel generally adds value and sticks to their 
remit.  However, Council urban design officers add little value and they 
try and impose their individual preferences on a development without 
consideration of their impact on the overall development”; 
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 “Quite often we end up changing our designs to suit the whims of 
Council’s urban designers.  This does not improve the design.  We 
employ good quality architects and designers.  Council staff lack the 
expertise required to add value.  However, sometimes we just change 
the design to smooth the consenting process”; 
 “Best practice is a continually evolving concept which increasingly lifts 
the bar and cost on what is required within a development, particularly 
around earthworks and aspects of urban design”; 
 “Urban design should be about the street/building interface – the 
interface between the public and private realms.  However, they are 
going beyond their remit and trying to influence what is happening within 
the private space with no knowledge of the market and what will or will 
not sell”; 
 “Urban design principles are often in conflict with the requirements of 
other parts of Council.  For example in one development the urban 
designers wanted us to narrow the road and put traffic lights in an 
intersection whereas Auckland Transport wanted a wide road and a 
roundabout to improve traffic flow.  These guys do not talk to each other 
and the developer is left to resolve the differences.  This all adds to the 
time required to achieve resource consent and adds to our frustration in 
dealing with Council”. 
Car parking requirements 
Suburban apartment developers commented: 
 “Suburban apartment buildings need to provide their residents with car 
parks.  We need to provide more car parking than Council would prefer to 
make these units saleable.  Council wants people to use public transport 
which is fine however without car parks the units are very difficult to sell”; 
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 “The optimal number of car parks in a suburban apartment development 
targeting the mid to upper end of the market is 2 to 3 per unit with 
additional common parking for guests”; 
 “The number of car parks you can provide onsite will determine the 
number of apartments in a suburban apartment development”. 
Heritage controls and tree protection 
Suburban developers commented: 
  “Council is inflexible.  We proposed removing one protected tree which 
was located in the middle of our site and replacing it with a number of 
other trees (same species).  These were not seedlings but big trees 
specially grown in a nursery.  This had a significant impact on how we 
could design our development reducing the overall yield.” 
Length of the planning process 
Apartment and non-apartment developers commented: 
 “The amount of information required to get resource consent continues to 
increase.  It is also becoming increasingly front end loaded.  That is, we 
need to supply more detailed concept designs and plans much earlier in 
the planning process.  This means we incur the cost earlier in the 
planning process.  This can in some cases reduce our flexibility to adapt 
the development’s design as market demand evolves over a cycle”; 
 “Council officers seem to focus on the fine detail rather than the big 
issues associated with the development.  They get tied up in detail rather 
than considering the impact the development has on the surrounding 
neighbourhood”; 
 “Council is going beyond their remit in terms of the planning process and 
trying to socially engineer outcomes.  They also engage in planning by 
personal preference rather than process consents as per the operative 
rules and regulations”; 
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 “There appears to be a power play underway between the various parts 
of Council (planners, urban design, engineers, Auckland Transport, parks 
and reserves, and Watercare) as to whose views are dominant.  
Developers get caught in the middle and as a consequence this adds to 
the uncertainty of the planning process”; 
 “Council staff seem to lack urgency when processing consents.  They 
lack the appreciation or an understanding of the importance of getting 
consents processed in a timely manner.  For example, it is critical we do 
not miss an earthworks season.  If our consent is held up and we cannot 
get the earthworks done on time, this can put our development back for a 
year”; 
 “Lack of urgency within Council around the consenting process and the 
earthworks season.  If we miss an earthworks season it’s a big cost to 
the business.  Effectively we now need to plan an additional 12 months in 
advance compared to what we use to have to do to reduce risk.  For 
example we have already completed the internal consenting process for 
the 2015/16 earth works season;” 
  “The housing office part of the special housing area team have been 
good at assisting the resolution of internal Council conflicts”; 
 “We recently had one resource consent application where Council 
outsourced the processing to a private consultant.  It was amazing, the 
consent was processed in six weeks, the feedback focused on the major 
issues”; 
 “The way in which the feedback from different Council agencies is 
collated and fed back to the developers is not good.  The planners collate 
all the feedback from the different areas of Council and just forward it to 
developers.  The advice from different areas of Council always conflicts.  
We, the developers, are left to resolve these conceptual issues between 
the different areas of Council.  This all takes time and money”; 
     65 
 “Our developments are typically non-complying.  Consequently, although 
we engage with Council and seek their feedback, at the same time we 
prepare our resource consent applications with the expectation of going 
to the Environment Court to achieve the outcomes we require”. 
Retirement village developers 
Retirement village developers’ commented: 
 “We know our business better than anyone else, what will sell and what 
will not.  Our target market is well defined and our product is focused on 
their needs in terms of unit typology number of bedrooms etc.”; 
 “When we get offered a potential development site we approach Council 
to test what could be achievable on the site in terms of bulk.  This drives 
our initial decision on whether to gain control over the property”; 
 “We are long term holders of our properties and need to sell our units 
multiple times and consequently design our buildings with this in mind”; 
 “Council imposed height limits are an issue.  They reduce the number of 
units we can achieve and mean that we need larger sites to achieve the 
optimal number of units for our villages.  Council seems to lack the 
flexibility to consider the impact a building has on surrounding properties 
and instead just focus on its height.  What is wrong with having increased 
building height on large sites where the taller buildings are located in 
such a way that their impact is minimal?  For example, they do not 
overlook adjoining properties and will not shade them because of their 
position relative to the site’s boundaries”; 
 “We know what will work within our villages and what will not.  One of our 
key concerns is Council employed urban designers who have limited 
experience with developing retirement villages are trying to tell us how to 
design our villages, what the mix of typologies should be.  They have no 
idea or consideration of the impact this may have on the profitability of 
the development.  Why should we have to include typologies which we 
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will have trouble selling or altering the mix of villas versus apartments to 
meet their whim when it will provide an unbalanced mix of units within the 
complex”; 
 “Consequently, although we have some flexibility in our design to 
incorporate Council officers’ suggestions, we prepare our consent 
applications with the expectation that we are going to go to the 
Environment Court.  We have good internal staff and contract the best 
external experts.  We are not unreasonable in terms of what we want to 
develop, however Council knows that our resources are better than theirs 
and we will generally win (albeit with some compromises) if we go to the 
Environment Court.” 
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